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COMBINING PROFESSIONALISM, NATION
BUILDING AND PUBLIC SERVICE: THE
PROFESSIONAL PROJECT OF THE ISRAELI
BAR 1928-2002
Neta Ziv*
INTRODUCTION**

Professions distinguish themselves from trades and businesses by
claiming to serve a public function that reaches beyond the interests of
their members. Lawyers profess to promote legality and justice, a
public good, through the basic constituent of lawyering-legal
representation. Under this understanding, lawyers negotiate a tradeoff with society: they obtain the exclusive right to practice law and to
regulate their affairs free from state intervention, and in return they
fulfill an important public goal and societal need-law and justice.
These interests are served when lawyers place the interests of the
common good and of their clients beyond their self-interest.1
Thus, lawyers articulate their duties to clients and to the common
good as interdependent, by claiming that ultimate client loyalty is in
and of itself a means to promote desirable and important societal
values such as liberty, equality and legal certainty.2 But serving the
interests of individual clients does not always coincide with the
* Senior Lecturer and Director, Clinical Education Programs, Tel Aviv University
Law Faculty, Israel. An earlier draft of this work was included as a chapter in my JSD
dissertation from Stanford University Law School entitled, Human Rights Law and
Public Interest Lawyering: A Study on the Interdependence of Jurisprudence and the
Legal Profession in Israel (June 2001). 1 wish to thank Deborah L. Rhode, Lawrence
Friedman and William Simon for reading and commenting on the dissertation. I want
to thank Issachar Rosen-Zvi and Ronen Shamir for comments on the first draft of this
work, and Russell Pearce for his helpful comments and encouragement to publish this
work.
** The Fordham Law Review relies on the author's translations for the Knessett
Protocols, the meetings of the Jewish Lawyer's Association, and the Bar Association
materials.
1. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and Their Society: A Comparative Study of
the Legal Profession in Germany and in the United States 13 (1973). For a summary
of the main sources to this functional approach to legal professionalism, see Russell
Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift. Why Discarding Professional Ideology
Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1237-40
(1995).
2. For a critical view on this approach see William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis:
The Decline of the ProfessionalIdeal, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 565 (1985).
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advancement of the public interest. In contrast, critics assert that
lawyers' professionalism rests upon their duty to third parties or to the
broader community, and that the centrality of the lawyer-client
relationship creates an impediment on such public duties.'
The
central tenet of lawyering-namely, client loyalty-thus bears an
inherent tension: it is claimed to be the basic and essential component
of lawyers' public duties, but it has also become the symbol of lawyers'
abandonment of their public role.4
Still, in order to maintain the status and privileges of a recognized
profession, lawyers need to articulate and define their public rolewhich entails settling the tension between individual representation
and public-communal interests-for themselves and their particular
communities of reference.
To gain societal legitimacy and
recognition, the process of constructing and defining the legal
profession's "public role" must remain consistent with the specific
conditions amidst which it is formed, embedded and operates. In
other words, lawyers' ethos of public service needs to conform to the
value system existent within their society.
In this article, I illustrate this process by examining the formation
and development of the Israeli legal profession from the 1920s to
today. My central argument is that the professional ideology of the
Israeli bar was contrived by defining concepts of public and private
spheres in a manner that harmonized with the political, social and
cultural values prevalent in Mandatory Palestine and later in the State
of Israel. The public obligations of the legal profession were
construed to correspond with the central ideals of Zionism, namely
Jewish national institution and state building. At the same time, the
bar maintained a formalistic and private, client-centered approach to
legal professionalism derived from the British Mandatory legal
system, which constituted a dominant source of Israeli law and legal
culture. The combination of such a public-institutional objective
together with a private form of representation, allowed the Israeli bar
to exhaust its public obligations and forgo its social commitments
3. Simon calls the first approach "The Dominant View," under which "the
lawyer must-or at least may-pursue any goal of the client through any arguable
legal course of action and assert any non frivolous claim." William H. Simon, The
Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 6 (1998). The second type of
lawyering Simon labels "The Public Interest View" (formerly labeled in Simon's
works as the "normative" view), and its basic maxim is "that law should be applied in
accordance with its purposes, and litigation should be conducted as to promote
informed resolution on the substantive merits." Id. at 8.
4. On the tension between client representation and serving the good, see
Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice, Reforming the Legal Profession 49-80
(2000); William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice, A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics
(1998); Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formationand
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of American Lawyers' Role, 8 U. Chi. L.
Sch. Roundtable 407-10 (2001) [hereinafter Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing
Class].
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without altering the ethical tenets of individual client loyalty as its
main formative principle. Issues such as access to justice, legal
representation of poor people, and protection of human rights, for
example, were absent from the discourse, rhetoric, and practices of
the bar. The Israeli bar managed to keep its dominance as the
representative of professional ideology until the 1990s. Since then,
both the traditional concept of lawyering as well as the bar's
hegemony in this area has been eroding. The process is a result of
numerous factors including the entry of new social groups into the
profession due to changes in legal education, the sharp rise in
competition between lawyers, a new leadership of the organized bar,
the emergence of public interest and community lawyering, and a
stronger inclination of the Supreme Court to scrutinize the bar's
practices under Israel's new constitutional framework.5
The bar has responded to demands from within its ranks and from
external sources, challenging the preceding and existing professional
order. For example, the bar launched its first pro bono program in
2002 (following a two year struggle within its internal institutions); a
private law firm established in 2001 a pro bono law firm; numerous
lawyers are providing assistance to poor people through poverty
NGO's and almost all law schools are offering some kind of clinical or
community program as part of their legal education. At the same
time, market forces have led to changes in restrictive rules on lawyers'
practices. The total ban on advertising has been lifted and replaced by
a regulatory mechanism, and prohibition on lawyers' engagement in
certain occupations has been eased.6 Though it is still early to assess
the extent to which these trends will significantly alter the collective
role of the profession, they signal an important shift in the
professional ideology which, in turn, ought to be understood against
broader changes occurring within Israeli society. In the next sections,
I expose these connections, in an attempt to explain the evolving role
of the legal profession within Israeli polity and society.
I. THE BRITISH MANDATORY PERIOD

Lawyering entered its modern age in Palestine in the beginning of
the 1920s, shortly after the British Mandate took over the control of
the region in 1917. Throughout the British Mandate, Jews driven by
Zionist convictions moved to Palestine and began the process of
nation and state building, leading to the creation of the state of Israel
in 1948. The legal profession during that period developed under the
influence of three main forces and interests: first, the British legal
heritage from which lawyers derived both their formal status as well as
their ideals; second, the need to take an active part in the Zionist
5. See infra Part V.
6. See infra Part V.
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movement of nation and state building; and third, lawyers' move to
promote their professional status, social recognition and financial
interests as members of a new social class. These interests, which
simultaneously affected the growth of the legal profession, frequently
stood in direct tension with one other.
A. The British Influence on Lawyering During the Mandatory Period
During the Mandatory period, British courts served as the central
legal institutions for adjudication.'
Most of the criminal,
administrative, and civil matters were handled according to British
law, which prevailed as the law of the land.' British judges served in
all District Courts and the Supreme Court of Palestine, and English
was the main language of adjudication. By creating a web of
Ordinances that regulated most aspects of modern life, British
lawmakers influenced the legal culture of the emerging nation.9
Jewish lawyers who immigrated to Palestine perceived themselves
as part of a modern and Western legal culture. British law constituted
one of those elements and lawyers adopted many of its attributes
during the formative stage of the legal profession in Palestine."' Not
only the structural aspects of the administrative and legal
infrastructure of British Mandatory law were incorporated into the
emerging Jewish institutions and apparatus, but also its spirit and
belief systems." Lawyers identified with British legal doctrine, form
and style. Relations between local lawyers and British lawyers were

7. It has been common to describe the Mandatory law as the source upon which
Israeli law was built. Mandatory law is considered the first stage of the development
of modern Israeli law. See Daniel Friedmann, The Effect of Foreign Law on the Law
of Israel:Remnants of the Ottoman Period, 10 lsr. L. Rev. 192 (1975); Yoram Shachar,
History and Sources of Israeli Law, in Introduction to the Law of Israel 1-10 (Amos
Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt eds., 1995).
8. For a period of about 10 years starting from around 1918, a system of Hebrew
community courts (Hebrew Peace Courts) operated in Palestine side by side with the
courts of the Crown and the religious courts. This system ceased to operate in the late
1920s. See Ronen Shamir, On the Death of an IsraeliLegal System, in Mautner, Sagi &
Shamir, Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State 589-632 (1998)
[hereinafter Mautner, Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State]. In
addition, local religious courts maintained jurisdiction over personal status matters.
9. Assaf Likhovski, In Our Image: Colonial Discourse and the Anglicization of
the Law of Mandatory Palestine,29 Isr. L. Rev. 291 (1995).
10. Ronen Shamir, The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism and Law in Early
Mandate Palestine 25 (2000) [hereinafter Shamir, The Colonies of Law] states:
In law, the identification with the West was directly expressed in the
dominant attitude towards the newly established colonial system of
justice... English imported law and the legal ways of the British in general
were perceived by most Jewish jurists in Palestine as the incarnation of a
highly developed enlightened law.
11. See, e.g., Edwin Samuel, British Traditions in the Administration of Israel 33
(1957).
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established already in the early 1920s, as some of the more prominent
lawyers in Palestine came from London. 2
In 1920 Norman Bentwitch, the Attorney General for Mandatory
Palestine, established "Law Classes," the first institution for legal
education in Palestine. 3 Legal education in this institution included in
its first part skills training (taught by local Jewish and Arab jurists)
and at the second stage theoretical classes in law and jurisprudence,
taught by British jurists. The program of Law Classes was heavily
Anglicized, and many subjects of study were imported from the
British legal education system, regardless of whether they directly
applied in Mandatory Palestine.14 In general, law was taught as an
autonomous discipline, through a formalistic, positive approach. 5
The Mandatory courts in which lawyers conducted most of their
adjudication operated as colonial courts and applied English law and
doctrine.
These courts served as the model for future state
institutions. A legal doctrine under the British legal system was
formalistic, the precedents used in the colonial legal system were
British, the language spoken and used in the higher court system was
English and law enforcement officers were British. It was this
understanding of the justice system that the "pioneers" of the Jewish
legal profession experienced first-hand.
The basic professional concepts governing lawyers' practice in
Britain were reenacted in Palestine. First, membership in the English
bar conferred permission to practice law in the British colonies. 6
Second, The Advocates Ordinance of 1922, which regulated the
practice of law in Palestine, carried many of the characteristics
familiar within the British system on professional legal practice. It
conditioned legal practice on obtaining a formal license and required
a minimal apprentice period and the passing of ptofessional entrance
exams.17 The Ordinance imposed numerous formalistic requirements
upon lawyers (e.g., annual payment of fees, registration in a
professional registrar). Regarding fiduciary obligations, it defined the
core duties of the lawyer to act in the best interest of the client and to
assist the court in the administration of justice. 8 The Ordinance also
restricted lawyers' vocational activities to legal work only, prohibited

12. See Gavriel Shtrassman, Wearing the Robe, A History of the Legal Profession
Until 1962, at 20 (1985) (describing the influence of two British lawyers, Harry Sacher
and Horas Samuels, on Jewish lawyers in Palestine).
13. Assaf Likhovski, Legal Education in Mandatory Palestine,25 Iyunei Mishpat
[Tel Aviv U. L. Rev.], 291,300 (2001) [hereinafter Likhovski, Legal Education].
14. Id. at 304.
15. Id. at 301.
16. Id. at 296.
17. The Advocates Ordinance of 1921, §§ 2, 3 & 5.
18. See id. § 14.
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self-advertisement, provided instructions for attorney's fees and
established internal disciplinary tribunals.19
Hence Jewish lawyers in the Mandatory period developed their
professional identity with a strong correlation to the practices, rules
and ideals of the British Legal Professionalism. 2" This source of
professional ideology emphasized the private role of lawyers (i.e.,
their primary obligations to their clients 21 ), it strongly differentiated
between professionals and laypersons, and it was based on a
formalistic approach to law.22
B. Nation and State Building
The emerging Jewish Israeli legal profession also needed to define
its relation to the ideals of Zionism. Alongside the establishment of
administrative and legal institutions by the British administration, the
Jewish immigrants to Palestine began to build their own quasi-state
apparatus. The central goal of Zionism was to gather sufficient
numbers of Jewish people in the land and to "settle" the country,
particularly the rural areas and geographical frontiers. The new
immigrants were urged to build as many future state institutions as
possible in order to establish the political, economical, legal, and
cultural infrastructure of the reviving Jewish State. This scheme was
considered a principal vehicle to fulfill the goals of nation building,
and it also applied to legal institution building.
Since a primary objective of the Jewish national organizations was
to "staff" public and private institutions with Jews, the leaders of the
legal professional community in Mandatory Palestine viewed the
integration of Jewish professional judges and lawyers into the
Mandatory judicial system as the central method in accomplishing the
Zionist goals of Jewish nationalism. Bernard Joseph, who later
became the Minister of Justice in Israel, wrote in 1926 that real
nationalism depended on strengthening the ties to the Mandatory
state's institutions, increasing the numbers of "Jewish lawyers who
would penetrate the governmental establishment, [and] Jewish judges
19. Id. (describing the restrictions on engagement in commerce and prohibition of
advertising); id. § 15 (discussing the establishment of disciplinary tribunals).
20. See, e.g., Mautner, Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State, supra
note 8, at 619.
21. Compare this to the United States, where lawyers articulated their public role
to promote "the common good" to become part of the state's governance-i.e., as
Pearce states to constitute "a governing class," in contrast to the European traditional
concept of a guild. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class, supra note 4, at
388-89.
22. In fact, the formalistic nature of the bar was so pronounced that Simon
Agranat, who served on the Israeli Supreme Court beginning in 1948, declared as one
of the first tasks of the newly appointed Minister of Justice to come out against "the
excessive formalism of the bar." See Pnina Lahav, Judgment in Jerusalem: Chief
Justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist Century 81 (1997).
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courts, Jewish jurists who
who would be appointed to the Mandatory
23
would shape the spirit of Mandatory law.
Accordingly, The Jewish Lawyers' Association ("JLA") dealt over
and over again with the absence of a Jewish Judge in the Haifa
District Court. This issue was raised during the JLA's meetings in
1931, 1932, 1935 and 1937, and was considered a central topic in the
Association's struggle to strengthen the Zionist goals of nation
building. 4 So was the need to hire Jewish clerks in the court
Along this "structural" line, the establishment of
administration .2
magistrate courts in the periphery (Tiberias, Tsfat), which the JLA
demanded, was considered a "national" goal even though it stood in
tension with lawyers' "professional interest," i.e., the inconvenience
entailed traveling to distant towns for irregular court appearances.2 6
The role of Hebrew within the system of justice illustrates this
approach as well. During the first meeting of the JLA in 1928,
attorney Moshe Eliash (one of the leading lawyers in this period) gave
a lecture about the legal situation within the British mandate. Eliash
raised the question of what lawyers can do as Jews to strengthen law
and the justice system. He discarded the idea that the jurists' input as
Jews ought to be through influencing the substance of legal rules (for
example through the Jewish Halachic law), but rather via their form.
National Jewish interests can be fulfilled by giving the existing law, in
Eliash's words, "a Hebrew form, and the translation of the [Ottoman]
Megele to Hebrew by Gad Frumkin, can prove'27in what way we need
to dress the laws of the land in a Hebrew form.
23. Shamir, The Colonies of Law, supra note 10, at 112 (citing Ha'Aretz, 5.9.26).
24. See The Fourth Meeting of the Jewish Lawyers Association Committee, May
3, 1931 (Central Zionist Archives, J108/2); The Fifth Meeting of The Jewish Lawyers
Association Committee, June 1, 1936 (Central Zionist Archives, J108/2); The Seventh
National Council of The Jewish Lawyers Association, July 1935 (Central Zionist
Archives, J108/5); The Sixth Meeting of the Jewish Lawyers' Association Committee,
April 1937 (Central Zionist Archives, JI 08/12).
25. The Seventh National Council of The Jewish Lawyers Association, July 1935
(Central Zionist Archives, J108/5).
26. Id.
We are a Zionist-Settlement ("Zioni-Yishuvi") organization, and not a
purpose for ourselves and this should constitute a criteria in all our
In this area the boundaries between
professional public work.
"professionalism" and politics is fragile and unclear ....To explain this I
will bring a few examples. The appointment of a Jewish Judge in Haifa
which we fought for years is not only a professional matter, and also the
transfer of state institutions to Tel Aviv, or the question of transferring
Tsfat, Tiberias and the Jordan Valley [regions] to the jurisdiction of the
District Court in Nablus. Against this, perhaps our professional interest says
that we have to object to the opening of a magistrate court which convenes
once or twice a week in the settlements near the big cities and if we demand
their establishment, it is for national and not professional reasons.
Id.
27. The First Meeting of The Jewish Lawyers Association Committee, April 1928
(Central Zionist Archives, J108/2).
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The use of the Hebrew language in the courts by Jewish lawyers
constituted a constant struggle of the JLA, because many lawyers did
not abide by its official decision to prefer Hebrew to English. In order
to enforce this practice, the JLA's Central Committee decided, during
its second meeting in 1929, to make the use of Hebrew by lawyers in
the courts (and other governmental institutions) mandatory." In
subsequent meetings, the JLA expressed its dismay with Jewish
lawyers who refused to use Hebrew in court despite the decree of the
JLA. 29 This criticism was tied to complaints against "segregationist"
lawyers who did not become members of the JLA and maintained
their membership in the English bar, an act viewed both as an insult to
the JLA as well as a violation of their national duties.3 °
These structural-institutional aspects of Jewish national revival
were dominant in lawyers' professional efforts to take part in the
Zionist movement. However, they did not exhaust their professional
activity and occasionally lawyers did express concern over the
substantive values underlying individual legal representation, the
collective stand of the JLA, and their relation to the goal of nation
building. For example, in 1931, three years after its formation, the
central Committee of the JLA briefly addressed a number of public
interest issues in its meeting: it voiced its opinion against corporal
punishment of children, instructed the local committees to provide
legal aid to poor people (the Jerusalem branch appealed the
instruction), and joined the Jewish public's protest against the British
ban on Jewish immigration to Palestine.3 1 As to the problem of "land
speculation," the JLA posed a direct tension between lawyers'
financial interests and national objectives. As aforementioned, land
acquisition by Jews (either individually or by the Jewish national
institutions) was a top priority within the Jewish community. The
national institutions tried to prevent the sale of land to non-Jewish
purchasers. Apparently some lawyers represented Jewish "land
speculators" in such transactions and arranged for the sale of land to
28. The decision of The Second Meeting of the Jewish Lawyers Association
Committee in May 1929, stated:
The Committee confirms the temporary order issued by the Central
Committee regarding the use of the Hebrew language in writing and orally
in courts stating: It is mandatory for every Jewish lawyer, to use whether
orally and in writing, in all applications and pleadings before governmental
institutions generally and the courts in particular, the Hebrew language only.
Exceptions to this rule are 1. If the client is not Jewish. 2. If counsel for the
adversary does not know Hebrew. 3. In private appearances before judges.
29. On the difficulties of enforcing the use of Hebrew, see Shtrassman, supra note
12, at 52-62.
30. The lawyers who maintained their ties to the British bar provoked extensive
fretting. See The Sixth Meeting of the Jewish Lawyers' Association Committee, April
1937 (Central Zionist Archives, J108/12).
31. The Fourth Meeting of the Jewish Lawyers Association Committee, May 3,
1931 (Central Zionist Archives, J108/2).
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non-Jews. This behavior was discussed in the JLA's meeting in 1935,
and was described as "a heavy national misdeed and also a grave
violation of the professional ethical rules and lowering of our moral
status. "32
During the period of the Jewish revolt against the British Mandate
(1945-1946),33 and further during 1945-1948, when Jews fleeing from
Europe attempted to enter Palestine, the tension between law,
Lawyers questioned their
lawyers and nationalism peaked.
professional role when the British government imposed administrative
restrictions and used emergency security regulations against the
Jewish population in Palestine. During this period some lawyers
34
assisted in trials of Jews accused of illegal immigration to Palestine;
others offered representation to administrative detainees and
members of the Jewish resistance underground. The JLA spoke out
against the use of emergency regulations by the British government.35
However, even during those turbulent days, members of the JLA
argued about their proper role in the national struggle. Some asserted
that the JLA must remain an apolitical-professional organization
while others argued that it carried an obligation to take part in the
national strife.36 Indeed, during this period the enlistment of the legal
32. The Seventh National Council of The Jewish Lawyers Association, July 3,
1935 (Central Zionist Archives, J108/5).
33. The goal of the national revolt against the British was to end the British
Mandate in Palestine; it included all the underground paramilitary resistance
movements and used all methods of passive and active resistance to the British
government.
34. The most notable one was Max Zeligman, together with his partner, Max
Kritzman, who represented Jewish prisoners from the underground group "Etzel."
See Shtrassman, supra note 12, at 125-32.
35. On February 7, 1946, 400 lawyers came together in a meeting organized by the
JLA to protest the violations on personal liberty imposed by the British government.
During this meeting Bernard Joseph stated that it was the duty of the lawyers to alert
against the danger in the emergency regulations. See' Shtrassman, supra note 12, at
149-50.
36. Shtrassman quotes two leaders within the association who professed
contrasting views about the role of the legal profession at that time:
Moshe Korot stated in a national committee [meeting] that was held before
the end of World War II: we have to rise above the mundane affairs and
memos that have been submitted or will be submitted.... The question
before us is: how can we integrate ourselves and our organization in the
historical struggle of the yishuv and of our people for our survival ... the
political problems of the yishuv have distinctive legal aspects and our legal
and organizational problems are of great political worth, and they cannot be
separated.
Id. In contrast, Moshe Dunkelblum was resistant of any involvement of the emerging
bar in political affairs:
[O]ur organization is not a political association. Each one of us belongs to
his own political organization and there he expresses his activity. True,
lawyers do not have the best public reputation, but this has always been so
and in all countries. Our reputation will rise only if we raise our professional
performance... we must take care only of those political questions which
have a direct bearing on our profession or on the legal reality.
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profession to the national cause and to the struggle against the British
Mandate intensified. But despite the common view, forwarded by
lawyers themselves, that the legal profession played an important role
in the "Yishuv" struggle against the British Mandate, in fact, the
lawyers who mobilized to take an active part in the Jewish rebellion
against the British Mandate in the 1940s were a passing and peripheral
phenomenon.37
In sum, despite occasional reference to the substantive connection
between lawyering and Jewish national revival, for the most part,
lawyers defined their public role by establishing, strengthening and
expanding Jewish "staffing" of legal institutions. Lawyers generally
did not see their contribution to Jewish national renewal through the
development of a particular value system of law-Jewish or universal.
Law and legal institutions were instrumental to Jewish national revival
in a structural rather than a content-value manner. Little attention
was paid to the substantive aspects of Jewish-law-renewal, which is the
kind of law that would be applied within these legal institutions or the
norms governing the lawyers that appear before them. Rather the
mere infiltration and expansion of Jewish professional presence in the
state-to-be apparatus served to recreate the new Jewish entity, which
was to evolve into the Jewish state.38
C. Guarding Self-Interest
The third force that shaped the development of the legal profession
during the Mandatory period was the effort to promote lawyers' selfinterest as a professional and social group. As Richard L. Abel
illustrates, similar to other professions in modern capitalist societies,
lawyers seek control over the market for their services. They do so
through attempts to control the marketability of the "commodity"
they provide (legal services), as well as of the providers of the service
They restrict entry into the profession, demand
(lawyers). 39
exclusivity for provision of services, pursue social closure, and limit
competition between their members as well as from outside sources.
In common law England, the legal profession carried the same
characteristics, which can all be traced to the process through which
the legal profession evolved during the Mandatory period.4 °
Id. at 166-67.
37. Lawyers tended to glorify their involvement in political cases during that
period, and "war stories" of lawyers became noslatgic memories of the "old days" in
which the state-to-be was struggling. See Y. Shabo, One Year in the Life of the Jewish
Lawyers' Association, 28 Hapraklit [The Advocate], 44-50 (1972).
38. Shamir, The Colonies of Law, supra note 10, at 92-100.
39. Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 18-30 (1989) [hereinafter Abel,
American Lawyers].
40. Richard L. Abel, England and Wales, A Comparison of the Professional
Projects of Barristers and Solicitors, in Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, 1
Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World 23 (1988) [hereinafter Abel, England
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Many, if not most, issues on the agenda of the JLA concerned the
need to protect lawyers' interests as members of a distinguished
profession.
Encroachment on lawyers' exclusive jurisdiction
constituted a major concern for the association. From the late 1920s
and for three decades thereafter, the lawyers practicing in Palestine
were incessantly concerned with "the problem of petition writers"laypersons who assisted the public in filing court cases and registering
land transactions. The practice of petition writers was well established
in Ottoman Palestine, and the emergence of the professional bar in
the late 1920s created a harsh competition between them and the new
professionals, who moved to secure their exclusive jurisdiction and to
displace the "old experts."41 The meetings of the JLA during those
years were permeated with complaints, concerns, disappointments,
suggestions, and ideas on how to deal with this problem, which in 1935
found its way to the Tel Aviv District Court.4"
The lawyers
approached the Ministry of the Colonies in England as well as the
Attorney General in Palestine in order to ask for enforcement of the
rules against the petition writers, but met resistance from within the
bar. After the court decision barring anyone who was not a lawyer or
a lawyer's clerk from conducting land transactions, some Jewish
lawyers turned to hire the same petition writers as their official clerks,
thus enabling them to handle transactions before the land registrar.
This response drew heavy criticism from the JLA, which even
considered joining forces with the Arab Lawyers' Association (a step
that stood against the Jewish national interest of separating the two)
to combat this seeming threat.43
The JLA was also constantly concerned with the growing number of
licensed lawyers and regularly complained, "there are too many
lawyers."" In 1937 there were 246 Jewish lawyers licensed to practice
law in Palestine (and 112 Arab lawyers), and the JLA dealt with
several proposals to restrict entry into the profession, such as closing
one of the existing law schools. The lawyers also decided on minimal
and Wales].
41. Cf. Andrew Abbot, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of
Expert Labor (1988).
42. See The Seventh National Council of The Jewish Lawyers Association, July
1935 (Central Zionist Archives, J10815). The JLA initiated a complaint against
petition writer Michael Neeman in the Tel Aviv Magistrate Court, in which the court
accepted the claim but was apparently sympathetic to the defendant. On appeal, the
Tel Aviv District Court affirmed the lower court's decision, and seemed to be more
supportive of the JLA's claim. As a result, the petition writers initiated a legislative
amendment in order to secure their professional jurisdiction.
43. Id.
44. See The Sixth Meeting of the Jewish Lawyers' Association Committee, April
1937 (Central Zionist Archives, J108/12); The Fourth Meeting of the Jewish Lawyers
Association Committee, May 3, 1931 (Central Zionist Archives, J108/2); The Seventh
National Council of The Jewish Lawyers Association, July 3, 1935 (Central Zionist
Archives, J108/5).
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attorney fees in order to restrict internal competition and complained
about clients "shopping" for the cheapest lawyer as a practice that
degrades the profession.45 In short, the newly emerging bar was
deeply engaged in efforts to obtain real and symbolic privileges for its
members and to secure their interests from old and new threats to
their accumulated achievements.
In sum, during the pre-state period the Israeli legal bar developed
under the influence of three major political forces. First, there was the
British legal heritage from which many of the lawyers received their
basic conception about law and lawyering.
This system was
formalistic, doctrinal, and emphasized the private role of lawyers, i.e.,
their chief duty to their clients. Within this framework, little was
conveyed to members of the profession concerning their responsibility
for attaining substantive justice.
Second, the legal profession was formed during a period saturated
with a nation-building ethos. Jews immigrating to Palestine were
directed to prepare the institutional apparatus for the Jewish State.
This way the profession could, on the one hand, discharge of its public
duties, necessary to claim the status of a professionalized group, and
at the same time continue to preserve its private orientated practice
by maintaining the principles of autonomy, independence, and client
loyalty.
Third, the emerging bar strove heavily to create a structure and a
culture that would provide lawyers with social status, financial
advantage, and unique privileges. It is striking that from 1942-1944, in
the midst of World War II, the JLA continued to deal with rather
mundane matters: the "petition writers" problem, stricter exclusive
jurisdictional rules, "improper competition" between members of the
profession, accountants that performed legal work, and the ever
worrisome problem of the excessive number of lawyers in the
country."
It is therefore not surprising that lawyers emerged into the newly
established state with a rather weak professional commitment to ideas
such as public service and professional social accountability. The bar
focused inwards, towards its members and clients, as a means to
preserve its professional identity and interests. As will be discussed in
the next section, this disposition was reinforced as the new state's
legal mechanism was being contrived. Thus, when the British
Mandate ended, the State of Israel was founded and the elite of the
45. In the Seventh National Council of The Jewish Lawyers Association, July 1935

(Central Zionist Archives, J108/5), attorney Shoham from Haifa "warns the members
from a disgraceful habit of a notorious type of clients who call, for example, a number
of lawyers and ask on the phone about their fees, and to choose the cheapest. Against
such phenomenon [they] must fight."
46. Shtrassman, supra note 12, at 165; Michael Keren, Law, Security and Politics:
An Israeli Case Study, 21 Int'l J. Soc. L. 105, 113 (1993).
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legal establishment was incorporated into the state bureaus;47 lawyers
in Israel, then a little over 500 in number, resorted to minding their
own interests and those of their clients.
II. THE EARLY YEARS

The structural-institutional manifestation of lawyers' "public role,"
described above, carried over into the early stages of Israeli
statehood. Nation and state building continued to form the central
goals of Israeli polity well into the first two decades of statehood.
When the Israeli Supreme Court was inaugurated, the newly
appointed Jewish judges expressed their joy and pride in Jewish
national revival by use of such notions. The appointment of Jewish
judges to the Israeli Supreme Court in and of itself was considered a
symbol of sovereignty, a revival of old hopes and dreams.
Commemorating this historical occasion, Chief Justice Moshe Zmora
recalled the following traditional diction: "For almost two millennia
the Jewish people were praying three times a day: 'Restore our judges
as at first'; trembling we approach today the fulfillment of this
vision."48 Lawyers took part in constructing this ethos by joining the
newly established state legal institutions. However, this was not a
smooth transition for the lawyers, as the central values of Israeli
society during that period stood in discord with the dogmas of the bar
and the legal profession.
A dominant social ideal that permeated sovereign Israel in its
earlier years was collective solidarity, coupled with the goals of nation
and state building.49 Yonathan Shapiro describes the combination of
nationalism and collectivism as follows:
The spiritual hegemony of Mapai (the governing labor oriented
party) was based on a few basic principles which were conferred
upon the Israeli society at large by its leadership. The first was the
national principle in its Zionist version. The national ideology
47., On the early appointments of lawyers to the Ministry of Justice and the courts
see Ruth Bondy, Feliks: Pinhas Rozen and His Time (1990). On the appointment of
the first Supreme Court Justices from the top ranks of the private bar, see Eliakim
Rubinstein, Shoftei Eretz: Lereshito Velidmuto shel Beit HamishpatHaelyon Belsrael
[Judges of the Land: The Origins and Image of the Israeli Supreme Court] (1980).
Interestingly, Jewish judges who served on the Mandatory courts were usually not
appointed to the Israeli Supreme Court. Rubinstein explains that because the
establishment of state institutions was conceived as an act of sovereignty, Mandatory
court judges could not symbolize this transformation and most were not re-appointed.
Id. at 73.
48. Resorting to quotations from Biblical sources, perhaps building an imaginative
connection between judges in the newly established state and the biblical era of the
book of Judges, was common in other inauguration speeches as well. See Lahav, supra
note 22, at 84-85.
49. For a recent critique of the socialist ethos and its subordination to nationalism
see Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the
Making of the Jewish State (David Maisel trans., 1998).
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preferred the collective interests of the nation to the will of the
individual. This collectivism was also the basis of the socialist view.
Abolition of private property and preference of a cooperative
economic community was an expression of the socialist collectivist
philosophy. Mapai managed to fuse the nationalist Zionist view
with the socialist collectivist.'

Individuals were
Collective ideals trumped individualism.
perceived as bearers of collective objectives and their interests
subordinate to the national cause. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak

write that "[t]he perception of the individual as a bearer of collective
ideals whose commitment to these ideals makes him or her
subordinate to their imperatives was characteristic of both the
pioneering ideology and the ideology of the national radical right.""1
Expressions of individualism, writes Yaron Ezrahi, were conceived as
a miscarriage of the prevailing Zionist ideals and "as symptoms of the
breakdown of high ideals and the disintegration of communal life, not
as the inner spiritual dramas of the individual and the issues of his or

her social authenticity." 2
Lawyers (as well as judges) did not easily blend into this scheme of
collectivism and bureaucratic rule and were estranged from this
dominant culture. At the time, Israel's elite groups were associated
with Zionist pioneering projects: land redemption, agricultural work
and security. 3 Israel's historiography concentrated on transforming
the image of the old Diaspora Jew implanted among books and holy
studies to the New Jew. The New Jew was a pioneer-settler,
connected to the land and striving to protect the emerging nation from
its enemies.54 These symbols of national revival, well entrenched into
a hierarchical social structure of the pre-state era, continued to govern
during the first decades of Israeli statehood.
Lawyers, in contrast,

50. Yonathan Shapiro, An Elite Without Successors, Generations of Political
Leaders in Israel 26 (1984).
51. Dan Horowitz & Moshe Lissak, Origins of the Israeli Polity 131 (Charles
Hoffman trans., 1978) [hereinafter Horowitz & Lissak, Origins in Israeli Polity]; see
also Dan Horowitz & Moshe Lissak, Trouble in Utopia, The Overburdened Polity of
Israel 153-54 (Charles Hoffman trans., 1989) [hereinafter Horowitz & Lissak, Trouble
in Utopia].
52. Yaron Ezrahi, Rubber Bullets, Power and Conscience in Modern Israel 97
(1997).
53. On the early Israeli elites, see, e.g., Eva Etzioni-Halevy, The Elite Connection:
Problems and Potential of Western Democracy 111-12 (1993).
54. Ezrahi, supra note 52, at 175. "At the heart of Zionist revolution that
culminated in the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 was the transformation of the
Jew from a member of a disempowered and vulnerable religious minority into an
armed citizen-soldier of a sovereign state governed by a Jewish majority." Id.
55. The Mapai party, which continued to control the political arena, did not have
many lawyers within its institutions. Rubinstein, supra note 47, at 27-28. Contrary to
other Western societies, the number of lawyers in key political positions in the first
two decades of Israeli statehood was low. For example, in the first six parliamentary
terms, less than six percent of the Knesset members were of legal training. See Ronen
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were associated with the letter of the law, with official rules and
formalistic precedents. They did not play a central part in the epic of
Jewish nation building nor produce any heroes in Israel's pre-state
revolutionary movements. Lawyers worried about their inferior status
and the issue was occasionally discussed in the main professional
publication of that time-Hapraklit (The Advocate). Polonsky, one
of the leading lawyers in the 1960s wrote: "we cannot deny that in our
or popular to the extent
country too our profession is not appreciated
56

which befits this kind of profession.
The frustration over the subordinate status of lawyers and judges is
also reflected in writings of Supreme Court judges from this period.57
Justice Vitkon, who was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1954,
stated that the first generation of state builders was driven by ideals of
socialism and pioneering, under which agricultural settlement was the

primary condition for national revival. "The New Jew" in Israel was
expected to internalize and exhibit these qualities, and the ruling
bureaucracy of Mapai looked down at jurists who did not endorse
Supreme Court Justice Itshak Olshan recalls:
such characteristics.
"In the eyes of a few ministers, and especially in the eyes of senior
officials-even if not expressed in public-the Supreme Court Justices
were perceived as 'too superior creatures'... we often had to

confront disrespect on behalf of part of the bureaucracy. '59 The
decision to locate the Supreme Court in Jerusalem exemplifies this
point, too. Lahav explains that the location of the Supreme Court in
Jerusalem (in the "Russian Compound") dismayed the Justices, who
would have preferred it be located in Tel Aviv, close to other state
Shamir, Society Judaism and Democratic Fundamentalism--on the Social Roots of
Judicial Interpretations, 19 Iyunei Mishpat [Tel Aviv U. L. Rev.] 699 (1995).
56. A. Polonsky, The Status of the Lawyer in the State and in Law, Hapraklit [The
Advocate] 168, 169 (1961) [hereinafter Polonsky, The Status of the Lawyer].
57. The desire of the judges to become part of Israel's renewed and developing
culture can also be illustrated through judicial folklore-like stories from that era.
Shneor Z. Cheshin, who served as a magistrate and district judge in Mandatory
Palestine and later became a member of the first Israeli Supreme Court, provides an
account of the court-folklore of that period in his book documenting his years as the
peoples' judge in Palestine. The judge describes the court and the law as being very
close and accessible to the local community and to its customs and traditions. He
highlights the gaps between formal law and community norms that created, in his
words, "laughter and tears" in this forum. This narrative attempts to situate the
Jewish judge close to and among "his" people in a crucial historical time and place. It
is interesting to note that these court tales contain no mention of lawyers at all. The
people and the judges interacted in these stories unmediated by any professionals.
Shneor Z. Cheshin, Tears and Laughter in an Israel Courtroom (1959).
58. Alfred Vitkon, The Law in a Developing State, in Jubilee to Pinhas Rosen 72
(1962). Vitkon also states that the values of pioneering led people "first and foremost
to agricultural settlement and redeeming of the land, in which they saw the primary
condition to the revival of the nation, while the legal profession, along with other
occupations the Jews excelled in, in the Diaspora, were considered loathsome." Id. at
72-73.
59. Itzhak Olshan, Din Udvarim 240 (1978).
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offices, but could not because of acute land shortage. The Justices
complained that "such mundane matters as judicial facilities were
rather low on [the government's] priority list," and Lahav concludes,
"the Supreme Court of Israel was established in Jerusalem more out
'6
of necessity than out of choice. "
Neither did lawyers carry the personal attributes of the elite social
groups. To blend into the upper social and cultural milieu, one
needed to display socially appreciated attributes such as informality, a
capacity to improvise, flexibility, and initiative. Horowitz and Lissak
explain that, in their private and public lives, people were expected to
display behavioral codes that manifested ideals of egalitarianism,
modesty, and collective solidarity. 6'
Lawyers' concerns with
formalism, honorable behavior, civility, and proper attire did not
correspond with those norms, and were considered inferior to
qualities such as improvisation, flexibility, and genuine creativity.
In particular, lawyers' preoccupation with honor in their formal and
informal directives highlighted their cultural estrangement from the
dominant social ambience, which-at least on the rhetorical levelpraised opposite traits of modesty and informality. If legal rules
reflect at least partially professional ideology, a primary objective of
the rules that directed and regulated lawyers' professional conduct
was to maintain the "honorable" image of the profession. The Israel
Bar Association Act and the ethical rules promulgated under this
statute are pervaded with the duty to preserve the honor of the
profession. 2 Under these rules, lawyers' duties of loyalty and
devotion to clients must correspond with their obligation to preserve
the honor of the profession and of the court.63 Other instructions that
require respectable and honorable behavior are abundant: Ethical
Rule 32(a) obligates the lawyer to retain the honor of the court and of
the profession during representation, and subsection (b) restates the
duty to appear before the court honorably (including wearing
appropriate attire). Ethical Rule 33 requires the lawyer to be polite
and to respect the honor of persons involved in the legal process and
Rule 23 instructs the lawyer to act cordially towards her adversary.
This "bourgeois" private-oriented character of the bar was poignantly
reflected in the centrality of notions such as honor, decor and civility,
dominant in the profession's codes and culture. These attributes
stood in discord with a society that was hostile to formalism and
60. Lahav, supra note 22, at 83-84.
61. Horowitz and Lissak, Origins in the Israeli Polity, supra note 51, at 108. A
member of the labor movement elite, for example, was expected "to behave in a
conspicuously egalitarian manner in his relations with the rank and file." Id.
62. On the enactment of the Israel Bar Association Act and its ethical rules, see
infra section IV in this chapter.
63. Rules of the Bar Association (Professional Ethics), 1986 Kovets Hatakanot
4965, (Sept. 4, 1986) Rule 2.
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celebrated-at least symbolically- comradeship, informality, and
collective responsibility.
On a deeper, conceptual level, the central dogmas underlying legal
representation conflicted with the notions of collectivism and national
solidarity. In this respect, law carried a dual function. On the one
hand, it was the formal language of the new sovereign state by which
the legislature (Knesset) was establishing a new political and social
order. Similar to other State apparatus during that era, law was
conceived through instrumental terms: whether it was constructive or
obstructive to the collective national cause.' At the same time, law
constituted the doctrinal basis of the legal profession, carried out
through the act of representation. The underlying basis of legal
representation, however, was individualism: lawyers were expected to
be devoted to their clients and to advance their interests even beyond
those of the state or the nation. Thus, the lawyers' defining
professional norm was in tension with the prevailing themes of
national reconstruction.
Against this indeterminate background, the legal profession strove
to position itself within the emerging state institutions. The bar
needed to align with the state, on the one hand, and maintain the
private-individualistic nature of legal professionalism, on the other.
As mentioned above, in the pre-state era, when Jewish institution
building was the primary national objective, lawyers defined their
public role through the formation of Jewish legal institutions in the
emerging system of justice. Following the establishment of the basic
state mechanisms, lawyers continued to organize their professional
basis tightly around the courts as state institutions. At this stage, their
public role was articulated, and professed, by joining the courts in
constructing the basic elements of a liberal democracy and by
strengthening respect for the rule of law.
Individual representation served this objective by ensuring access of
litigants to the judicial system. As stated by attorney Polonsky in
1961, "we have to promote the feeling that involvement of the lawyer
when the rights of the individual are infringed is for the benefit of the
state and the democratic rule. '' 65 Thus the private role of lawyers
(pursuing the interests of their clients) was portrayed as a means to
carry out a collective goal: enhancing respect for the rule of law within
the emerging democratic state. Lawyers did not forward a vision of
their profession as a constituent of Israel's civil society,
counterbalancing state power, but as a state interest. Here again,
lawyers' duties to the public were satisfied without a need to venture
into any particular value system and its relation to law, and without

64. See, e.g., Sternhell, supra note 49, at 322.
65. Polonsky, supra note 56, at 169.
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offering any substantive orientation to law, legal representation, or
professional ethics.
The professional disposition described above should also be
understood in relation to the attempts of the Israeli Supreme Court
during those years to establish its own status and role during the early
era of Israeli statehood, and in the context of a clear division of tasks
that gradually emerged between the bar and the bench in this period.
It is now widely acknowledged within Israeli jurisprudence that in
the first two decades the Israeli Supreme Court resorted to legal
formalism as a means to constitute law's relative autonomy and to
loosen the heavy grips of state politics. Since forces of statehood and
collectivism were strong, the court's distinctive contribution to
democracy was protecting the individual against the state and laying
the foundation for at least a formal adherence to the rule of law. This
task was especially demanding due to the lack of a formal constitution
in Israel that guaranteed basic individual rights. In order to achieve
this goal, the court resorted to a doctrinal and formalistic application
of law. Martin Edelman describes this process:
In the early years of the State, the Supreme Court was necessarily
concerned with establishing its authority by generating respect for
its decisions. The Justices were aware that in the turbulent domestic
and international situation of their new state, appeals to practical
necessity could be used to evade or ignore court orders. Therefore,
the early Supreme Court opinions were characterized by a highly
formalistic legal style, narrow interpretations of statutes and
precedents, adherence to stare decisis, and deference to the
decisions of the political branches .... Throughout, the civil courts
emphasized the importance of the rule of law and their own
objective to adhere to those rules.66
Menachem Mautner provides another explanation for the court's
formalistic disposition during this period. He claims that its basis lies
in the gap between the ideals and values of the judges on the one
hand, and the prevailing values among other state institutions and the
public on the other. Mautner claims that some of the justices (who
came from England, the United States and Europe) believed in values
of individualism and liberalism, and recognized the importance of a
court that would safeguard both formal and substantive aspects of the
rule of law. Confronted by an ethos of nationalism and collectivism,
the court was bound to become an estranged cultural entity within its
own society. Formalism, argues Mautner, enabled the court to
conceal the value-dimension of its decisions and to present the judicial
process as a technical mechanism. Under this reasoning, the outcome
of judicial decisions was 'inevitable' to the process and was not
reached based on any value choice of the court. Legal formalism
66. Martin Edelman, Courts, Politics and Culture in Israel 42 (1994).
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therefore allowed the court "to cloak the cultural gap that existed
at
67
the time between the court and the society within which it acted.
Whether the formalism of the court was a cloak to conceal a valuebased cultural gap or the judges at the time simply had a more
restrictive attitude towards their institutional role,68 throughout the
1950s and the 1960s the court gradually transformed its professional
authority into a moral one. Although the court based its rulings on
formalistic rather than substantive grounds, the Israeli Supreme Court
laid the substantive constitutional infrastructure for the protection of
individual rights in Israel, which was further developed and expanded
in later decades.69
Already at this early stage, the bar and the court began to articulate
their division of roles within the evolving legal framework. The court
moved, prudently and incrementally, to incorporate into Israel's
constitutional infrastructure a judicial bill of rights. Basic rights and
liberties such as freedom of assembly and speech, equality, and
freedom of religious worship became part of Israel's unwritten
constitutional properties. 0
Unlike the court, the bar did not further any substantive or
normative platform, such as protection of individual rights, equality
under the law or even equitable access to the justice system, by use of
its professional advantage. During the early decades of Israeli
statehood, it continued to protect the structural foundations of the
emerging liberal democratic institutions in Israel, under the rationale
that soundness of legal institutions also guaranteed the stable status of
the legal profession.7"

67. Menachem Mautner, The Decline of Formalism and the Rise of Values in
Israeli Law 125 (1993).
68. Mautner, Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State, supra note 8, at
609.
69. See generally Baruch Bracha, The Protection of Human Rights in Israel, 12 Isr.
Yearbook of Human Rights 110 (1982); Stephen Goldstein, Protection of Human
Rights by Judges: The Israeli Experience, 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 605 (1994); Asher Maoz,
Defending Civil Liberties Without a Constitution- The Israeli Experience, 16 Melb. U.
L. Rev. 815 (1988); Amos Shapira, The Status of FundamentalIndividualRights in the
Absence of a Written Constitution, 9 Isr. L. Rev. 497 (1974).
70. Freedom of expression was recognized in the precedent case of H.C. 73/53,
Kol Ha'am v. The Minister of Interior, 7(2) P.D. 871, translatedin Selected Judgments
of the State of Israel 90 (1953). See also H.C. 14/86, Laor v. Theatre Review Board,
41(1) P.D. 421; H.C. 680/88, Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor 42(4) P.D. 617.
Freedom of religion and worship was recognized as early as 1962 in H.C. 262/62,
Peretz v. Local Council of Kfar Shmaryahu, 16(3) P.D. 2101.
71. In comparison, on the situation in the United States, see Jerold S. Auerbach,
Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 263 (1976) ("As
long as the public retained faith in the integrity of the legal process, the bar preserved
its precarious compromise between the politics of professionalism and the rule of
law.").
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III. THE ISRAEL BAR ASSOCIATION ACT- PRINCIPLES AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Interestingly enough, conceptualizing the profession's public role in
accordance with state interests as described above was pursued in a
way that placed the bar outside the scope of the public-state sphere.
To do so, lawyers needed to create and preserve an enclave of
professionalism. As a strategic move, they wished to assume control
over many aspects of lawyers' professional conduct. First and
foremost, it was necessary to detach the profession from the state
controlled Legal Council, a remnant of the British era, that was
responsible for licensing and examinations of lawyers.72 Second, the
bar moved to make membership in the organization mandatory.
These goals were not new, and lawyers had discussed them since the
1930s as "The Bar Question"-how to go about establishing an
independent professional organization.13 After the founding of the
state, obtaining this goal was more likely, so members of the bar
introduced to the Knesset a bill that would establish their new
independent organization.
The debates that accompanied the
enactment of the Israel Bar Association Act between 1959 and 1960
revealed that the primary motive of the bar was to preserve lawyers'
autonomy. Lawyers claimed that giving them an independent status
was rightful and timely. Throughout those deliberations there is
hardly any evidence of considerations relating to the public interest or
common good. During an era saturated with notions of statism,
nationalism, and collectivism, lawyers were the first group to break
away from state control, demanding and obtaining an autonomous
professional status.
A. General
The Israeli Bar Association is a statutory body with broad authority
over matters related to lawyering in Israel.74 One main statute governs
lawyers' activities and status-The Israel Bar Association Act of 1961
("IBA Act").75 The IBA Act founded the bar and its organs and set
72. The Legal Council Ordinance of 1938 was one of the legal sources for
regulating the profession. The second formal basis for lawyers' regulation was the
Advocates Ordinance of 1938 (originally enacted in 1922), which regulated lawyers'
conduct. In addition, there was a voluntary lawyers association in which many, but
not all lawyers were members. The association conducted disciplinary hearings on
ethical misconduct of lawyers.
73. See, e.g., Pinhas Avissar, Bterem Lishka [Before the Bar], Hapraklit [The
Advocate] 28, 38, 41 (1961.) (describing "The Bar Controversy").
74. For a comparative and critical overview of the Israeli bar's privileges
compared to lawyers' associations in other countries, see Eli M. Salzberger, The
Israeli Jurists Conspiracy-On the Israeli Bar and its Allies, 32(1) Mishpatim 43

(2002).
75. The Israel Bar Association Act of 1961, 347 Sefer Hachukim, 178 (1961)
[hereinafter IBA Act].
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the general principles for lawyers' conduct. The bar is authorized to
promulgate rules under the IBA Act.76 The bar approves admittance
into the profession, administers entrance exams, and provides
licensing. Membership in the bar is mandatory and lawyers must also
pay yearly dues to the organization.77 The bar administers internal
disciplinary forums (regional and national), issues rules of ethics, sets
dress codes, and oversees the required apprenticeship period before
taking the entrance exams. Eli Salzberger claims that the scope of the
bar's reach over lawyers' conduct, its autonomy from external
intervention, and the extent of exclusive restrictive conduct regarding
unauthorized practice of law is unprecedented compared to other
common law and civil law countries.7 8
The collective interests of the profession dominate the law. 79 The
chapter that oversees ethical conduct sets forth a general behavioral
requirement that the lawyer "will preserve the honor of the profession
and will abstain from any matter which might harm the honor of the
profession."8 Other rules devise strict boundaries that distinguish
between members of the bar and outsiders,81 and broadly defines
activities only lawyers are permitted to perform. s2 The law also
restricts internal competition between lawyers through rules limiting
self-advertisement83 and client solicitation, 8' and continues to
76. Rules of the Bar Association (Professional Ethics), 1986 Kovets Hatakanot
4965, 1373 [hereinafter Ethical Rules].
77. IBA Act, § 42 (discussing mandatory membership); § 93 (discussing
membership fees).
78. Salzberger, supra note 74, at 56-64.
79. Compare Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 39, at 18-30 (arguing that
American lawyers constructed their regulations to gain control over their services,
pursued social closure to promote professional mobility, and demanded control over
the production of lawyers).
80. IBA Act § 53.
81. For example, until 2002 section 60 of the IBA Act prohibited lawyers from
practicing as accountants or engaging in commercial business that has not been
approved in rules promulgated by the bar, or practicing any other vocation that does
not befit a lawyer. This restriction was eased. See infra note 179.
82. IBA Act § 20. A non-lawyer is prohibited from representing another person
in any judicial or quasi-judicial forum, in arbitration, and in a list of numerous other
administrative proceedings. Such administrative bodies include the land registrar,
companies' registrar, patent registrar, and various tax authorities. Law students, for
example, cannot provide formal representation in hearings. In addition, sections 9698 criminalize any such activity carried out by a non-lawyer and restrict the court
from accepting a civil fee suit by a non-lawyer who engaged in activities that are
exclusive to lawyers only.
83. Id. § 55. In 2000, the Professional Advertising Regulation Act (Legislative
Amendments), 2000 (S.H. 182), allowed lawyers to advertise their services according
to rules to be promulgated by the bar. In 2001, the total prohibition against
advertising was replaced with a set of ethical rules that prescribe the scope of
authorized advertising. Bar Ethical Rules (Advertising) 2001.
84. IBA Act § 56. In the past, advertising was a basis for disciplinary action. In
1994, for example, the bar attempted to restrict courier offices from providing land
transaction registration services. Israeli lawyers handle almost all land transactions,
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differentiate between lawyers and non-lawyers through meticulous
regulation of the use of titles and degrees on letterheads and doorsigns. 5
Loyalty to the client is a central theme permeating the law and
ethical rules. The primary rule that addresses duties to clients (and to
courts) states: "In the fulfillment of his duties the lawyer will act for
the benefit of his client, faithfully and with devotion, and will help the
court to generate law." Similarly, another ethical rule requires that
the lawyer will represent his client "faithfully, with devotion and
without fear, while acting in fairness, in honor of the profession and in
perseverance of an honorable disposition towards the court."86 The
courts, too, have interpreted devotion to clients as the main medium
through which professional conduct ought to be assessed.
The IBA Act and ethical rules include instructions regarding client
confidentiality," prevention of conflict of interests8 and collegial
duties towards other members of the profession.89 But beyond those
basic requirements, the law and ethical rules lack even minimal
guidance about the profession's ethical principles. As a general
statement, the law
and ethical rules direct lawyers to assist the court to
"generate law," '' and instruct them not to assert a factual or legal
claim that they know to be false. Lawyers are guided to represent
their clients fairly,9 and are allowed to terminate the lawyer-client
relationship if there is disagreement about the manner in which
representation should be provided.92 A lawyer may refuse, of course,
and receive a percentage of the value of the transaction as their fee. Many aspects of
this job are technical in nature, especially the formal registration stage, which entails
bringing filled out documents to the land registry for approval and final registration.
When lawyers began to use courier and messenger services to carry out this task, the
bar objected and filed suit against the courier office. The case reached the Israeli
Supreme Court and was settled in a way that allowed courier offices to provide this
service only if they are affiliated with law firms, and in a manner that left lawyers the
control over its provision. H.C. 4951/93, "Mismach" Legal Services Inc. v. The Land
Registrar, The Ministry of Justice and The Israeli Bar Association. The settlement
received court approval on April 5, 1994. For the settlement terms, see Takdin Elion
94(2) 2369 (1994).
85. IBA Act § 57.
86. Ethical Rule 2, supra note 76.
87. Section 90 is broadly versed: "Words and documents exchanged between a
lawyer and his client which carry a relevant correlation to the professional service a
lawyer renders the client the lawyer shall not reveal in any legal procedure, except if
the client waived his confidentiality." IBA Act § 19; see also Ethical Rule 19, supra
note 76 ("A lawyer will keep confidential anything that was brought to his knowledge
by his client or on his behalf, when fulfilling his duties, except if the client agreed
explicitly otherwise .... ).
88. Ethical Rules 14-18, supra note 76.
89. Id. at 26.
90. IBA Act § 54.
91. Ethical Rules 2 & 34, supra note 76.
92. Ethical Rule 13, supra note 76. The wording of this section suggests
nonetheless that it is aimed more at preserving the lawyer's autonomy than at
achieving a just outcome from the representation.
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to represent anybody on any grounds, and must notify the client
promptly of a decision not to assume representation.9 3 However,
beyond a general guidance to act in fairness (including a prohibition
to misguide the court)94 the rules are generally silent about lawyers'
substantive ethical obligations to the public good, including third
parties and society at large. 95
The IBA Act and ethical code largely emphasize behavioral style
and etiquette, and are less ambitious about substance. Most of the
rules are structural and delve in minute detail into the makeup of
disciplinary boards and their jurisdiction, the structure of bar
institutions, election procedures to the bar's internal institutions and
internship requirements. 96 The law and the code do not direct lawyers
to assist in the generation of substantive justice, nor are they
accompanied by any comments that guide lawyers in any definite way
to act morally as part of their professional role.
In this context it is interesting to follow the changes in terms chosen
by the Israeli legislature compared to those used in the British
ordinance that preceded the IBA Act, to describe the duty of lawyers
towards the legal system. Section 54 of the IBA Act states that a
lawyer must act for the benefit of his client and assist the court to
"generate law," using the term "mishpat" to describe "law." The term
mishpat in Hebrew could mean either law or justice. The equivalent
English section in the British Advocates Ordinance of 1922 (the origin
of the IBA Act) stated that the advocate must "assist the court to
administer justice." 97 In the formal translation of this section into
Hebrew,98 the English term justice was translated into the Hebrew
word tsedek, the common Hebrew term for substantive-justice.
Moreover, in the proposed bill introduced in the Israeli Knesset in
1959, the term tsedek appeared as the professional principle guiding a
lawyer's relationship with the court.99 However, as a result of a
93. Ethical Rule 12, supra note 76, affords lawyers an unqualified privilege not to
represent clients. Thus the rule can be used as a source to claim that lawyers' ethical
principles allow them to terminate or refuse representation. The rules, however, are
silent on this point, and seem to be aimed at preserving the liberty of the lawyer
rather than obtaining an undesired outcome stemming from representation.
94. Ethical Rule 34, supra note 76.
95. On the price of abandoning a code of ethical principles for a code of rules see
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 64748 (1985); see also Salzberger, supra note 74.
96. See IBA Act, chapters I (the establishment of the bar), II (the bar's
institutions), III (exclusive jurisdiction), IV (training and education), V (membership
in the bar), VI (professional ethics and disciplinary hearings, Sections 53-80, out of
which only sections 53 and 54 direct lawyers in any substantive way about ethical
principles), VII (attorneys' fees), VIIA (special circumstances when a lawyer is
deceased), and VIII (miscellaneous).
97. Advocates Ordinance of 1922 § 14.
98. Haitton Harrishmi [Palestinian Gazette], July 5, 1922.
99. Section 50 of the Bar Association Bill, 395 Hatsaot Hok 370 (June 1, 1959),
states: "A lawyer must act to the benefit of his client with devotion and loyalty and he
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demand put forward by the lawyers, the term "tsedek" was aborted
and was replaced by the term "mishpat," symbolically conferring a
lesser commitment to the merited outcome of adjudication on account
of its process.1 0
Through the IBA Act, the Israeli bar managed to formalize an
extensive degree of independence from the state. Abel explains that
the paradox of professional independence is that it can only be
achieved through the authorization of the state.'" Professionals must
negotiate the level of their autonomy with state agents in order to
subsequently be free of state control. The legislative process of the
IBA Act, which ultimately was enacted in 1961, thirteen years after
Israel gained its independence, illustrates this dilemma well." 2
B. The Legislative Hearings
It was not a simple and speedy task for the bar to establish in law its
desired professional autonomy. In fact, despite continuous advocacy
by lawyers during the 1950s, it took the Israeli Knesset thirteen years
to enact a statute that recognized the status of the Israeli bar.""
Throughout the parliamentary debate one can detect uneasiness with
the central objective of the bill-to grant lawyers an autonomous
status-during a period of tight state involvement and control.
Numerous Knesset members were ambivalent about the emerging
themes of the proposed law. 4 On the one hand, they felt that if Israel
claimed to be a modern Western state, it would have to recognize the
independence of certain professions. At the same time, it was difficult
to reconcile such a laissez-faire approach with prevalent ideas of
statism and collectivism." 5 These dilemmas reflect suspicion and
discomfort not only with the ideals underlying lawyers' collective

must assist the court to administer justice (tsedek)."
100. On the background and the meaning of this change, and how it conveys
different approaches to the role of lawyers compared to judges, see Haim H. Cohen,
Fiat Iustitia, Hapraklit [The Advocate] 37, at 47. Cohen, a former Supreme Court
Justice, claims that the change was introduced based on an erroneous theory held by
lawyers that lawyers do not owe a duty to help the court establish truths beyond their
loyalty to their clients. Id.
101. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 39, ch. 1.
102. Knesset Protocols from December 21, 1959, at 152-59; Knesset Protocols from
December 22, 1959, at 160-74 [hereinafter First Reading Protocols]; Knesset
protocols from January 11, 1960, at 288-304; Knesset Protocols from June 6, 1961, at
1927-54 [hereinafter Second Reading Protocols].
103. On the attempts to enact the law between 1948 and 1959, see Dr. Joshua
Rotenshtreich, The Establishment of the Bar Association, Hapraklit [The Advocate]

1987, at 37.
104. Second Reading Protocols, supra note 102, at 1932, 1950.
105. Tension also arose because of the need to conciliate between the national
interest to successfully absorb as many new immigrant lawyers as possible, and the
interest of the bar to establish prerequisites and barriers to practice. See First Reading
Protocols at 1934, 1938.
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autonomy, but also with the principles of individual legal
representation."0 6
Throughout the parliamentary discussions, the bar demanded
extensive autonomy as a manifestation of trust and confidence that
ought to be conferred upon it by the state and the public. Lawyers
asserted that they were worthy of this privilege because of their
qualities, status, maturity and prestige. Debates over independence
and self-governance permeated the parliamentary hearings and
formed the core deliberations over the bill.1" 7
Minimal attention was paid to the role of lawyers in the
preservation of justice. When then Minister of Justice P. Rosen
presented the bill before the plenary, he nominally underscored both

106. In various contexts the principles prescribed in the bill stood in contrast to the
leading values of nation building. For example, the 'original version of the bill
included a requirement that a lawyer must retain Israeli citizenship to become a
member of the bar, but this requirement was dropped during the Law and
Constitution Committee deliberations between the first and the second reading.
However, this omission raised objections at the plenary based on Zionistic ideals and
"aliya" (immigration to Israel). Because "aliya" and pioneering were considered so
central to Israeli society at the time, these values did not coincide with the prospect of
a person becoming a lawyer without assuming citizenship, i.e., full and formal alliance
with the state. It appeared against the grain of state and nation building that persons
would come to Israel only "on condition" of their financial success; thus, some
claimed that lawyers should not be allowed to obtain personal and financial gains
without assuming the full risks of becoming Israeli citizens. A vivid objection was
raised by Member of Knessett ("MK") Kushnir:
If a person comes from a country where he had lived in wealth, South Africa
or something like that, where he could have servants and live in an
apartment of ten rooms and in great comfort, and he has to come to this
country, to the state of Israel, and here the conditions are still those of
pioneering.... and we tell him: no rush, do not fear. Look, if you do well
and you can live at a very high standard similar to where you came fromyou can get your citizenship. But if you can't-pack your bags, sit on your
suitcases for a few years, and return to the place you came from. Should we
allow such a privilege?
Second Reading Protocols, supra note 102, at 1939. Subsequently this objection was
refuted on the basis that lawyering did not require particular loyalty to the state (like
civil service does), since it was a free vocation, and the requirement of citizenship was
omitted.
107. See, for example, the debate over the role of governmental representatives in
the governing bodies of the bar during the discussion towards second and third
reading. Second Reading Protocols, supra note 102, at 1931 (justifying the demand to
restrict the role of governmental representatives in order to protect lawyers' pride
and autonomy). Similarly, the reason for the arrangement by which the head of the
bar would be elected by the general committee was to ensure that the chair enjoyed
"prestige and independence." Also see the debate over budget supervision of the bar
and its authority to demand membership fees. Id. at 1950-51.
During these
deliberations, the chair of the Law & Constitution Committee stated, "Should we not
trust them for this purpose? If we don't trust them like that, we shouldn't give them
autonomy at all." Id. at 1952. The chair also stated, "If on the 14th year of the state
we decided to grant the lawyers the bar association law, it is because the legislator
believes that they have sufficiently matured in order to handle their affairs internally
autonomously." Id.
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the private and public duties of the legal profession. On the one hand,
he stated, the legal profession was a free vocation, providing its
members with freedom, honor and independence. At the same time
the profession carried the duty to implement law and justice." 8
However, as the discussions over the bill continued, little was
mentioned about any other substantive duties of lawyers, such as
ensuring equal access to justice. Most of the debate centered on the
level of independence the bar should receive and the fear of Knesset
members that lawyers
would abuse this autonomy for anti-competitive
10 9
and closure policies.
During the legislative debates, professional autonomy was not
explicitly presented in exchange for the bar's obligation to further
substantive justice or equal access to the legal system. Reference to
these issues was minimal. For example, Member of Knessett ("MK")
Zimmerman from the General Zionist Party expressed concern with
the lack of attention to lawyers' power to abuse the law:
The debate conducted here leaves the impression that the purpose
of this bill is to protect lawyers, the profession and its proficiency. I
disagree with this opinion. I believe that the purpose of this bill and
of the law when it is passed is to protect the public.... It is similar
to giving someone a dangerous tool and not telling him how to use it
positively and therefore he can use it in a negative way. 10
MK Zadok of Mapai, who later became the Minister of Justice, also
mentioned in his speech the public duties of the profession to provide
services for the poor and to contribute to legal reform. 1 ' However,
during the lengthy debate towards the second and third reading of the
bill, there was only one reference to the bar's responsibility to provide
112
legal representation to poor people.
By and large, most of the parliamentary discussions rested upon an
assumption that the bar does not carry strong commitments to the
public good. Moreover, some provisions in the original bill that were
designed to impose an elevated level of accountability on the
profession were either deleted or changed. The original bill, for
108. First Reading Protocols, supra note 102, at 152.

109. Fear from closure measures such as restrictive exams and control over other

entry requirements permeated the debate continuously, across political parties. They
were mentioned by MK Mintz (Religious Torah Front Party), MK Ben Israel (Mapai
Party), MK Verhaptig (National Religious Party), Azniya (Mapai Party), MK Bibi
and Nir Refealex (Labor Union Party), to mention a few.
110. First Reading Protocols, supra note 102, at 295.

111. Id. at 164.

112. Second Reading Protocols, supra note 102, at 1930. Discussing whether this
obligation should be mandatory or voluntary (the latter view was adopted), the chair
of the law and constitution committee raised an expectation that the legal profession
at some stage "will handle this issue in a satisfactory manner and ensure legal
representation to the needy. In this case we could make this duty obligatory and
relieve the state budget from providing it." Id.
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example, stated that the bar was being established in order to unionize
all lawyers, to protect their professional interests, to supervise their
professional training, to further the betterment and pureness of the
profession and to "advance law in general."'' 13 This latter purpose was
the only society-oriented function of the bar and it was eliminated
before the second reading. I have already mentioned that in its
original version the bill described the duty of lawyers to assist the
court in administering justice, while in the final version the term
"justice" was replaced with "law." The bar, therefore, demanded
broad autonomy but did not offer much in return. Its claim for
independence rested upon the argument that the profession had
sufficiently "matured" to gain self-control, but not that lawyers
actually carry public obligations of any sort."'
The bar demanded and received extensive control over the
"production" of lawyers and the regulation of their conduct. Various
amendments intending to limit such control were defeated." 5 For
example, the original bill required a five-year tenure for a lawyer to
serve as a trainer for an apprentice. An amendment to shorten this
period to three years, in order to encourage trainers and accelerate
entry to the profession, was defeated."6 A proposal to replace the
requirement that an apprentice receive approval of the bar to change
a place of internship, with the need to simply give notice, was
rejected; an amendment to allow lawyers to practice as accountants
was rejected; an amendment to abolish the bar's authority to set
maximum attorneys' fees was rejected; an amendment to establish
parliamentary supervision over bar membership fees was rejected, as
was an amendment that the bar's annual budget be approved by the
Knesset." 7 A proposal to change a section, which deprived the civil
113. Bar Association Bill § 1, Hatsaot Hok 395 at 370 (June 1, 1959).
114. For example, MK Bar Hai (Mapai) stated: "The important question that is
before us is, actually, one: has this profession matured to the stage that it deserves
autonomy in two areas-entrance to the profession and internal discipline?" First
Reading Protocols, supra note 102, at 167.
115. Some of the original provisions that granted lawyers excessive advantage over
others were nonetheless defeated. A provision (section 81 of the bill) that would have
allowed ex parte collection of attorney's fees was removed from the original bill. The
rationale for this provision was that it was not proper that lawyers would need to turn
to the court to claim their fees. First Reading Protocols, supra note 102, at 155.
Another provision (section 93 of the bill) that would have placed the burden of
proving innocence on a person accused of providing services that were restricted to
lawyers, was also removed between first and second readings.
116. The debate over the number of years needed to train an apprentice was the
amendment of MK Schoffman who stated:
I wish heatedly to take this into account and not to impose artificial barriers.
If we don't want lawyers-let's admit that. If we want to restrict lawyerslet's say this explicitly. But don't do it by borrowing measures from
countries which we don't want for us to set an example.
Second Reading Protocols, supra note 102, at 1936.
117. Id. at 1937, 1946, 1951, 1953.
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court of jurisdiction over a fees claim by a non-lawyer who provided
services that were exclusively restricted to lawyers (in addition to the
act being criminalized), was defeated as well.'
In order to gain independence lawyers advocated the conception of
the legal profession as a free vocation, assuming that market forces
would determine the availability of legal services. Inasmuch as the
bar restricted market forces in determining who could practice law, it
accepted that legal services would be distributed according to these
principles. The bar thus constructed itself as one of the state's liberal
institutions without venturing into the terrain of substantive rights.
Indeed, the philosophical basis of these discussions presupposed a
liberal adversarial system of justice: the bar was conceptualized as an
organ that represented individual clients, its lawyers as agents who
acted on their behalf. Lawyers were to protect the "rule of law," i.e.,
access of individual clients to court, by enabling the aggregate of many
such 'private' representations. Accordingly, loyalty to the client was
the fundamental commitment of a lawyer, constituting the basis of the
profession's public duties." 9
It is important to note that during that period Israel's legislative
process did not involve participation of groups that represented the
public's interest, in the broad sense of this term. The IBA Act was
purely created by lawyers in the government and lawyers from within
the bar. Besides the organized bar, records do not indicate that any
non-governmental or citizens' groups appeared before The Law and
Constitution Committee. 2
Israeli civil society at the time was
undeveloped and there were hardly any organized citizens' groups
that advocated for public or communal interests. Members of the
Knesset who were sensitive to the lack of low cost legal services, to
the inadequacy of the free market to distribute legal services fairly,
and to the control of the bar over the professionalization of legal
118. In this context, reference to the British Ordinance was used as a justification
for restricting civil action for fee collection by a person who provided services
contrary to the jurisdictional sections of the law:
In the Advocates Ordinance... there is such an instruction since 1938. It
goes without saying, that if a person that is not a lawyer provides the service
of a lawyer, he cannot claim his fee. He cannot give legal advice in that
profession ... he cannot do the things that the law exclusively designates for
lawyers. And it is intolerable that when we decide to give autonomy to this
profession this right be taken away from lawyers and that we cancel this
section, after 40 years... [T]his has been a vested right of lawyers for forty
years in this country.
MK Meridor, on behalf of the Law & Constitution Committee, Second Reading
Protocols, supra note 102, at 1953-54.
119. For example, MK Zadok stated: "the democratic nature of the state is judged
by the role fulfilled by lawyers in the judicial system. This role includes two elements:
the freedom of the citizen to choose a lawyer as he sees fit, and the freedom of the
lawyer to advocate fearlessly on behalf of his client." First Reading Protocols, supra
note 102, at 163.
120. Rotenshtreich, supra note 103, at 40.
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services, could not rise to challenge the power of the bar. At most,
they impeded upon some excessive demands of the bar and blocked
some marginal unjustified advantages, which lawyers moved to
proclaim for themselves. However, there was not any significant
opposition that demanded a higher standard of accountability to
provide pro bono services by lawyers, or that conditioned the bar's
monopoly over lawyers' entrance to the profession on the
establishment of regulated low cost legal services. Indeed, as
mentioned by MK Zimmerman, the favor of the law seemed to
protect the profession rather than the public.
The IBA Act came into force in 1962 during a period in which law
and legal institutions were in their formative stage in Israel. At that
time, there was strong demand that law conform to the goal of state
building, but there was also recognition of the need to set the
foundation for a democratic infrastructure, in which legal institutions
would not be subordinate to state interests. Against this backdrop,
the bar claimed and received broad autonomy, partially because
lawyers entered this process as a social group that was significantly
removed from the national-collective project. To a large degree,
lawyers had remained outsiders to the major national goals prevalent
at the time. The legal profession stayed in the private sphere of Israeli
society, albeit limited in its scope. Lawyers thus succeeded in
overcoming the strong trends of collectivism, in part by depicting their
private disposition as a means to attain the broader goal of state
institution building. As a result, the bar was afforded an autonomous
professional status with few demands upon lawyers to provide
substantial remuneration in return. This disposition continued well
into the 1990s, as the organized bar continued to present a rather
unified front regarding the manner in which it discharged its public
duties.
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION AS A CARRIER OF LIBERAL IDEALS
A. The Claim for ProfessionalIndependence
Professional independence, central in the earlier era of the bar's
formation, continued to be a dominant theme during the second stage
of democratic institution building in Israel, during the 1970s and
1980s. " '
Lawyers continued to "celebrate" their success in
121. On the independence of the legal profession in Israel, see generally, Michael
Keren, Professionalism Against Populism: The Peres Government and Democracy
64-68 (1996) [hereinafter Keren, Professionalism Against Populism]. Keren explains
that one of the main reasons the bar managed to keep its independence was its
distance from the Mapai party politics. Id. at 67. He explains further, though, that in
crucial points of political and legal crisis, the legal profession failed to use its
autonomy to confront basic violations of the rule of law, such as those described in his
book which investigates the role of the legal profession in the Shabac (GSS) affair. In
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establishing an independent bar. The 1972 issue of the bar's then
central publication, "Hapraklit," was dedicated to its tenth
anniversary. 122 The chair of the bar underscored that lawyers were
celebrating "10 years since [the] association had received full
independence" and continued to name the bar's central attainments:
easing lawyers' employment problems which had been augmented due
to the rise in the number of lawyers (a demand to distribute
government legal work amidst a larger number of lawyers),
establishment of a study forum for immigrant lawyers, establishment
of an institute for "continuing legal education," establishment of 12a3
special body that would handle economic services for lawyers, etc.
The growing number of lawyers continued, as always, to be a
worrisome issue. In 1973 attorney Hirshberg stated: "In the country
there exist too many lawyers beyond the objective needs of the Israeli
market and society." He suggested restricting entry to the bar by
changing legal education requirements to an LL.M educational degree
(instead of an LL.B). 2 4 The bar continued to struggle against lawyers'
public image as profit seekers who reaped disproportionate income
compared to their actual work. 25 Only rarely did the bar discuss its
public obligations: the duty to provide legal aid to the poor,2 6 the
problem of imprisonment for civil debts, 127 or the bar's duty to 12address
8
the crisis in the legal system due to the 1973 (Yom Kipur) war.
The desire and quest for "independence" was thus presented both
as a goal and as a means to strengthen the profession. It is important
to underscore that, throughout the 1970s, these goals continued to be
articulated with a strong correlation to state interests: lawyers'
autonomy was necessary to strengthen the state and the emerging
democratic regime.129 Contrary to the discourse that emerged at a
this case, members of the Israeli General Security Services had killed three
Palestinian captives who were in their custody and then tried to cover up the offense.
122. See A. Polansky, Current Issues: Jubilee of the Jewish Lawyers' Association in
the Land of Israel and 10 years to the Establishment of the Israeli bar, Hapraklit [The
Advocate] 28 (1), 3; see generally Hapraklit [The Advocate] 28 (1) (dedicated in
whole to this event).
123. Polansky, supra note 122.
124. A. Hirshberg, A Proposal for Changing Legal Education, Hapraklit [The
Advocate] 29, 148 (1973).
125. A Public Notice of the Bar's Central Committee, June 7, 1972. The Notice
referred to publications in the press, criticizing lawyers as living off huge profits, as
the cause for the state's economic distortions, and as the source of "anti-social" and
"immoral" behavior. Hapraklit [The Advocate] 29, at 506 (1972); see also A.
Polonsky, The Status of the Lawyer, supra note 56, at 168-75.
126. E. Slant, Legal Aid to the Needy, Hapraklit [The Advocate] 27, 364-71, E.
Slant, The Rich and the Poor in the Eyes of the Law, Hapraklit [The Advocate] 17, at
313-19.
127. The lawyers' association held a symposium on this problem in 1958. See
Hapraklit [The Advocate] 14, at 370-80 (1958).
128. A. Polonsky, The Bar in Emergency Times, Hapraklit [The Advocate] 29, at 12(1973).
129. Polonsky, The Status of the Lawyer, supra note 56, at 169.
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later stage, until the late 1970s, values such as personal autonomy and
individual liberty did not constitute the basis of lawyers' demand for
autonomy and independence.
It is not coincidental that the quest for professional independence
conjoined with a process under which the Israeli Supreme Court was
strengthening its own relative autonomy vis a vis Israeli political
institutions. 130 The correlation between the independence of the bar
and the judiciary in liberal states is recognized ubiquitously.
Terence Halliday and Lucien Kirpak claim that despite political
variances among nations "as a political reality, bar autonomy cannot
be dealt with as a separate fact in any country: it belongs to the
political constitution of society, and, more specifically, it is linked to
the relative autonomy of judges and the courts.' 131 This correlation
was notable in Israel, too.
If in the early period of Israeli statehood the conceptions
underlying legal professionalism were in dissent with those prevailing
in the country, this was no longer the case starting from the 1980s.
The rise of individualism and the decline of collectivism and social
solidarity had been a steady phenomenon in Israel. Values of mutual
responsibility had given way to personal fulfillment and individual
attainment.132 Patterns of consumption adopted Western styles and
the standard of living has been on the rise, together with a transition
into a market economy. Professionalism provided the scientific basis
for these trends, and has gained recognition and social
respectability.13 3 Policies of economic liberalism were carried out
through privatization and a lesser involvement of the state in the
They were enhanced alongside a liberal-individual
market.
philosophy and a liberal-legal discourse, which positioned the
individual as the central unit of both economic and legal scrutiny.
From the 1980s, the core conceptions of liberalism in legal
professionalism-manifested strongly in notions of client loyalty-did
not stand in discord with the prevailing values of modern Israel. If in
the 1950s both the bench and the bar needed to play down their
individualistic philosophy, this was no longer the case.
Thus, during the first period of Israel's existence, the formalism of
the court and of the bar coincided. Over the years, however, it was
130. See Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Constructing Professionalism: The Professional
Project of the IsraeliJudiciary,31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 760, 782-83 (2001).
131. Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Politics Matter: Comparative Theory of
Lawyers in the Making of Political Liberalism, in Lawyers and the Rise of Western
Political Liberalism 15, 33 (1987).
132. Horowitz & Lissak, Trouble in Utopia, supra note 51, at 180; Mautner, supra
note 67, at 125; Mautner, Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State, supra
note 8, at 254-55.
133. See Keren, Professionalism Against Populism, supra note 121 (describing the
rise of professional and knowledge elite groups in the 1980s and their role in
countering populist forces in the country).
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widely recognized that the Israeli Supreme Court strengthened its
activist posture and became more involved in controversial social and
political issues. The court continued to transform its professional
authority into a moral-normative one.'34 Consequently, the judiciary
became a relatively distinguished institution enjoying
considerable
13 5
public support for constraining government action.
In contrast to the court, which assumed a value-oriented or
substantive approach to law, the organized bar did not attempt to
convert its professional knowledge and expertise into any kind of
ideological or normative authority. It continued to promote the
traditional neutral approach to legal representation on the individual
level, together with a general organizational abstinence from issues
that carried any public controversy. The bar's publications of this
period, which largely reflect its agenda and business concerns, are
dedicated almost entirely to questions of legal doctrine and the status
of the bar itself. There is hardly any reference to problems of access
to justice, social justice, human rights, poverty, discrimination, etc.
Despite its dominance over lawyers' professional sphere, the bar
had to maintain its control over lawyers' practices and behavior. Abel
states that "[s]ocial closure is an elusive goal, even for the most
successful professions. It must be constantly defended against threats
from consumers and potential competitors as well as the consequences
of adventitious events."' 36 In Israel too, the bar has effortlessly tried
to prevent the derogation of its public image and reputation.
Two prongs were utilized for this purpose. First, the bar strove to
uphold an image of a lawyer that displayed respectability and civility,
to ensure that individual lawyers would behave in an honorable and
distinguished manner. Second, the bar constituted the collectivepublic role of the profession as a protector of the core institutions of a
liberal democracy, and in particular, the court.
These two strategies are connected.
Because lawyers' status
depends on the legitimacy of the justice system, the bar had a direct
stake in refuting any challenge to the judiciary. It was therefore
necessary to tackle instances in which lawyers behaved in a way that
134. By implementing substantive values and ideals that constituted, in its view, the
basis for a democratic society, the Israeli Supreme Court had become a leading
institution in protecting individual rights. This had been the prevailing view in legal
writings in Israel. Despite recent criticism of the Court's failure to apply the same
standard of human rights protection to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories,
current scholarship continues to portray the Israeli Supreme Court as the defender of
individual rights, and as a judiciary which "has met this challenge admirably," despite
Israel's security threats and economic hardships which pervade Israel's existence. See,
e.g., Allen Zysblat, Protecting Fundamental Rights in Israel Without a Written
Constitution,in Public Law in Israel 47 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996).
135. See Martin Edelman, The Judicial Elite of Israel, 13 International Political
Science Review (1992); see also Gad Barzilay et al., The Israeli Supreme Court and
the Israeli Public 186, 211 (1994).
136. Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 39, at 24.
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censured the justice system by enforcing
their ethical duty not to
1 37
degrade "the honor of the profession.
B. Protectingthe Honor of the Profession
Andrew Abbott explains that "[p]rofessional organizations often
concentrated on making members aware of their personal effects on
public perception.... [T]o this day it is violating the public image of
'
the profession that draws the heaviest ethical censure."138
This can
explain the bar's sensitivity to lawyers who publicly criticized either
the profession or the legal system.
A methodological caveat is in place. The cases described below do
not reflect a typical disciplinary proceeding of the Israeli bar, since
most disciplinary cases involve misconduct associated with the lawyerclient relationship.1 39 However, precisely those "unusual" cases that
do not involve an obvious breach of trust between lawyers and clients
draw attention to the extent of sensitivity of the organized profession
to its image and status.
In 1980, attorney Eli Zohar was interviewed by the Israeli
newspaper Ma'ariv as part of a series of articles about the legal
profession. During the interview, Zohar criticized the phenomenon in
which lawyers over-legalize certain acts or transactions for their own
interest, stating: "there are a million things for which one does not
need a lawyer, but there are a lot of lawyers in the market who need
work, and they give their client the feeling that it is not going to work
without them." For such criticism of the profession the Tel Aviv
district bar committee initiated disciplinary proceedings against
attorney Zohar. 40 He was charged, inter alia, with behavior that
degrades the legal profession and does not befit a lawyer. The
disciplinary court acquitted the attorney of these charges, stating that
the lawyer's expression touched upon an issue of public importance
and interest.
137. IBA Act § 61 (3) defines a disciplinary offense as "any action or inaction
which does not befit the legal profession."
138. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of
Expert Labor 61 (1988).
139. See Pinchas Stern, Lawyers' Ethical Professional Deviations and the
Professional Regulation Over Them (1991) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). According to Stern, most of the ethical violations for which lawyers were
disciplined during 1969-1986 concerned harm done to clients. Out of 320 disciplinary
decisions that were published by the bar (which represent a small amount of the
actual cases handled by the disciplinary tribunals-320 out of 2,500 cases between the
years 1969-1986), 64 cases were of the type of "victimless" offenses, i.e., cases such as
self-advertisement, improper expression, and the like. The rest (283 cases, with some
overlap between those cases) involved behavior that harmed a particular party, out of
which 157 cases involved injury done towards clients, and out of these over 90%
involved direct economic damage to those clients.
140. BDM (Disciplinary Board Hearing) 107/81 Tel Aviv Dist. Bar Committee v.
Att'y Eli Zohar.
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In 1986, attorney A. Gal published an article in the local Jerusalem
paper addressing the severe parking problems in the city. Gal, a
private practitioner who had also been involved in public affairs,
advised Jerusalemite drivers not to pay their parking fines but to
challenge their parking tickets in court in order to create a blockage of
the judicial system with these traffic violation trials: "The 'sting' and
the rational for this struggle is engagement in this process" he wrote.
In response to the content of this article, the Jerusalem district bar
committee initiated disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer,
charging him with behavior that does not befit a member of the
profession. Convicting the attorney, the disciplinary court stated that
such an expression amounted to impeding the court's function, and as
such "does not befit the status of a member of the bar as an officer of
the court whose role is to assist the court to make law."''. n An appeal
to the national disciplinary court was rejected on the same grounds,
holding that a lawyer calling citizens to "abuse" the judicial system, as
Gal did, crosses the line between legitimate expression and behavior
that does not befit a lawyer.
In 1993 the bar initiated disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer
who expressed his views following a particularly harsh decision of a
magistrate judge against his client bitterly criticizing the decision,
claiming it was rendered by "a judge in Israel, not in Sodom." The
magistrate judge convicted an elderly Bedouin woman of illegally
building (i.e., without a permit) a small fixed construction next to her
tent, in which she had placed a dialysis machine.'42 The district
disciplinary court convicted the lawyer for the offense of offending the
judge who decided the case. The national disciplinary court affirmed
the conviction, based on the need to maintain the integrity of the
judicial system and the public's trust in it. 43 The Israeli Supreme
Court reversed this decision and acquitted the lawyer, but on narrow,
almost frivolous, grounds. The Supreme Court stated that the issue
was "trivial," that the statement was made in bitterness, as part of a
general criticism of government policy regarding demolition of
Bedouin constructions. Nevertheless the court stated that it would

141. BDM (Disciplinary Board Hearing) 8/86 The Jerusalem Bar's Central
Committee v. Att'y Avraham Gal (decision rendered Apr. 11, 1988).
142. For a detailed description of this case, see Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinski,
Destruction of Houses and Construction of a Cause, in Cause Lawyering: Political
Commitments and Professional Responsibilities 227, 232-236 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold].
143. BDA (National Disciplinary Board) 7/93, Doe v. The Israel Bar Ass'n, 1995
Padim, 34-43. It is noteworthy that even the dissenting member of the panel based
her decision on a different 'balancing' between the interests of free speech and
maintaining the integrity of the judiciary. The substantive matter at stake, and its
obvious harshness, was not at all considered as a relevant factor in the analysis of this
case.
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have been better if the particular words used by the lawyer had not
been voiced.144
In these cases neither the bar nor the courts considered the merits
of these "unbefitting" expressions in terms of their accordance with
substantive justice or the public's interest.14 5 These cases (and
others) 14 6 judged professional behavior using neutral principles such as
free speech, the integrity of judges or protection of collegial relations.
These standards were applied impartially, notwithstanding the
difference in the relative merit of the substantive interest concerned.
A different analysis would, for example, distinguish between the Gal
and the Yovel cases, and afford heightened protection to speech
according to the issue at stake. Parking problems in Jerusalem are a
disturbing matter indeed, but state deprivation of the basic right to
health and housing based on ethnicity should provide the speakerand especially a lawyer-broader protection of his expression on this
"'
topic. 47
Such differentiation is foreign to the analysis of the
institutions mentioned above.
C. Sustainingthe Legitimacy of the Justice System
The bar and the judiciary in Israel bore an understanding about
their respective roles in preserving the status of the justice system.
Protecting lawyers' professional status is necessary to maintain the
symbolic status of law and of the rule of law, from which the court
derives its own legitimacy. Lawyers trigger adjudication and, in an
adversarial system as operated in Israel, the court relies on lawyers to
influence the outcome of adjudication. Given their interdependent
relationship, too great a loss in the legitimacy of the profession will
inevitably result in some lessening of the legitimacy of the court.
Courts therefore rely on lawyers as much as lawyers rely on courts,
and act based on this mutual understanding.
Accordingly, lawyers were expected to display respect and honor
towards the judicial system: criticism of the judiciary had its rules and
limitations, both in content and style. In turn, the court embraced and
reinforced the acclaimed doctrine forwarded by the bar regarding

144. A.B.A (Bar Association Appeal) 2339/94, Yovel v. The Israeli Bar Ass'n,
decision rendered on Dec. 31, 1995, 43 Dinim Elion, 427.
145. In the Zohar case the bar did not, but the disciplinary tribunal did.
146. See, e.g., A.B.A (Bar Association Appeal) 3558/93, Doe v, Tel Aviv Dist. Bar
Committee, 36 Dinim Elion, 50 (upholding a conviction of an attorney who accused
her colleague of meeting with an adverse witness and did so by notifying the court of
her letter). It was this "public" notification which triggered the proceedings against
the lawyer, of non-collegial behavior. A.B.A (Bar Association Appeal) 6839/93,
Se'adya v. Israel Bar Ass'n, 49(5) P.D. 849 (upholding a conviction of a lawyer who
accused a colleague of abusing his connections at the bar).
147. This is not to say of course that disciplinary hearings in the Gal case were
justified, but rather to highlight the ignorance as to the substantive matter at stake.
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lawyers' role in the justice system and about the nature of
professionalism and legal representation.
First, the Israeli Supreme Court consistently reaffirmed various
aspects of the dominant approach to lawyering 45 Early rulings of the
court, confirmed by later ones, accepted the centrality of the lawyerclient relationship as the essence of legal professionalism. The Court
noted that duties towards the clients are the means by which all other
tasks of a lawyer should be performed. In a 1955 case dealing with the
improper conduct of a lawyer, the Supreme Court of Israel stated that:
"This loyalty [to the client] is the life and soul of the profession, the
basis upon which it is structured. Remove the trust a client savors
towards his lawyer, and you eradicate the soul of the profession." The
lawyer-client relationship, explained the court, serves to advance the
prestige and image of the lawyer and the whole profession. 14 9 This
understanding of the core of the legal profession and its relation to
trust and1 professional honor has retained much of its force in later
5
rulings.
Second, the court sustained additional professional tenets embraced
by the bar. It recognized the legitimate interest in guarding the honor
and respectability of the profession,' 5 ' and implied that this objective
would be achieved not through a particular substantive legal
disposition but, first and foremost, by sustaining loyalty and trust
between lawyers and clients. In other cases the Supreme Court
mentioned that it is preferable that only licensed lawyers appear
before the magistrate court in misdemeanor cases (and not trained
police prosecutors),' 52 acknowledged the reasonableness of
restrictions imposed on lawyers' self-advertising and other restrictions
148. See Salzberger, supra note 74.
149. A.B.A. (Bar Association Appeal) 9/55, John Doe v. The Legal Council, 27(1)
P.D. 20:
By authorizing a lawyer to act within the profession the authorities are
announcing to the whole world that this authorized [person] is a decent
person and deserves the trust of the public to act within the profession and
within the law and everything else that derives and emerges from it.
Id.
150. A.B.A. 1/88, The Central Bar Committee v. Doe 42 (4) P.D. 472, 479 ("Full
trust between a lawyer and a client is the heart and soul of the legal profession.").
151. A.B.A. (Bar Association Appeal) 4/75, Doe v. The Central Bar Committee,
30(2) P.D. 197 (confirming the conviction of a lawyer's misconduct and breach of the
duty not to engage in commerce, finding that a lawyer's taking part in a car business
was harmful to the profession's prestige); see also A.B.A. 3866/95, Doe v. The Dist.
Bar Committee in Tel Aviv, 98(1) Takdin 622 (stating that a lawyer convicted of
severe misconduct should be disbarred not only to protect the public against future
misconduct but also because that lawyer harms the image and the honor of the
profession, and consequently the trust of the public in the legal profession).
152. H.C. 2631, 3212/91, Zigel v. The Minister of Police 46(3) P.D. 546 ("[i]t would
be preferable if all prosecutors who appear before a court will be licensed lawyers
who have completed their studies in a law school, performed their apprenticeship and
taken the exams that train them to act in the profession.").
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on practice.153 The court joined the bar in its concerns regarding
lawyers' use of proper language as a means to retain professional
honor and respect,154 gave deference to the bar's decisions not to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer and confirmed
professional behavioral standards set by the bar.'
The court also
conveyed the idea that even if the bar is a public and statutory body
bound by certain administrative rules (such as the fairness doctrine
and equality), it is mainly a professional
union that deals with the
56
internal matters of its members.1
Finally, it seems that the court and the bar share the philosophical
foundation underlying the lawyer-client relationship, as well as the
societal interests advanced through legal representation. Ghanem v.
The Israel Bar Association is an illustrative case. 57
Ghanem centered on the legality the of bar's Ethical Rule 27, which
dealt with the transfer of cases between lawyers. According to this
rule, a client who wished to switch his lawyer needed the consent of
the former lawyer, which could be refused if the former lawyer had a
pending fee dispute with the client. This being the situation, the client
had to commit to the bar's arbitration and to deposit whatever
amount the bar saw fit to guarantee payment to the lawyer pending
the decision in the arbitration. This rule posed severe hardship on the
client's right to legal representation or ability to switch lawyers. In a
petition on behalf of several individuals and The Association for Civil
Rights in Israel, the Supreme Court was asked to annul this rule. The
153. H.C. 5648/93, Doe v. Tel Aviv Dist. Bar Committee 48(3) P.D. 534. In this
case the court acquitted the lawyer of the offense of unauthorized advertisement
based on the lack of mens rea required for this offense. The court accepted, however,
that the statutory restriction on advertisement should be regarded as a balance
between two competing interests: the interest of free speech of lawyers, as well the
public interest that lawyers express themselves on issues of public concern against the
professional interests of honor and fair competition. Id. at 540. For an earlier case in
which the court confirmed the rationale underlying restrictions on advertising, see
A.B.A. (Bar Association Appeal) 4/75, Doe v. The Dist. Committee of the Tel Aviv
Bar Ass'n, 30(2) P.D. 197.
154. See, e.g., A.B.A.(Bar Association Appeal) 6839/93, Se'adya v. The Israeli Bar,
49(5) P.D. 735, 737 (stating the public's interest in guarding the reputation of
lawyers).
155. See H.C. 89/64, Grinblat v. The Israel Bar Association 18(3) P.D. 402
(dismissing a petition against the bar for rejecting a complaint against a lawyer despite
the negligence in the way it was handled by the bar); H.C. 248/81, Cohen v. The Dist.
Committee of the Israeli Bar 37(3) P.D. 533 (dismissing a petition challenging the
bar's decision not to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer); A.B.A. (Bar
Association Appeal) 3558/93, Doe v. Tel Aviv Dist. Bar Committee (declining to
intervene in the standard of behavior set by the bar, in which a lawyer who sent a
letter to the court accusing a colleague of meeting with an adversary's witness had
committed a disciplinary offense and rejected her claim that it was done in the best
interest of her client); Salzberger, supra note 74 at 79-84; see also H.C. 248/81,
Wallace v. The Dist. Committee of the IBA, 37(3) P.D. 533.
156. H.C. 6218/93, Shlomo Cohen v. The Israeli Bar Association, 49(2) P.D. 529.
157. H.C. 4330/93, Ghanem v. The Israel Bar Ass'n, 50(4) P.D. 226.
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bar defended the rule and argued that its purpose was not to

guarantee collection of lawyers' fees but to regulate an orderly
conveyance of cases from one lawyer to another and to ensure
collegial behavior between lawyers.
The court abolished the rule but based its decision on narrow
libertarian grounds. The majority of judges assumed that the purpose
of the rule was indeed to encourage appropriate collegial conduct

rather than to provide a means of fee collection. 158 However, the
court stated the rule was overbroad and unjustly restricted two basic
principles in Israeli law. The primary one was freedom of vocation of
lawyers. The secondary one was the personal autonomy rights of the

clients to freely choose (or switch) their lawyer. 159 Because the
desired collegial arrangements could be achieved by imposing less
burdensome restrictions on lawyers and clients, the rule was faulted

for being disproportionately broad.
The reasoning of this decision was indicative of the interests the
court values and protects. It reflects a clear libertarian approach to
legal representation, anchored in the freedom of vocation, recognized
in Israel as a basic individual right. Israel's law guarantees freedom of
vocation and the opportunity to practice law as an extension of that
basic individual right. 6" The lawyer-client relationship is constructed

in terms of liberal autonomy, formulated between two free and
independent individuals. The court did not base its decision on the
right of equal access to justice or the duties of the legal profession to

facilitate access to justice, nor did it challenge
the market-based free
6
enterprise ideology of legal representation.1 '
The Ghanem decision illustrates once more that despite the end

result of this decision (abolishment of the ethical rule) judicial review
has not put forth an alternative view of professional responsibility. It
defined the duties of the profession in terms of structural-procedural,
rather than substantive, justice. Ghanem exemplifies the correlation

between the institutional jurisdictional interests of the bench and bar

158. This was the position of Chief Justice Barak. Justice Strassberg-Cohen stated
that the real purpose of this rule was financial and not ethical/collegial at all.
159. Ghanem, 50(4) P.D. at 234-35.
160. In 1992 the Israeli Parliament enacted two Basic Laws, which have a
constitutional, or at least a semi-constitutional, status. The first one was Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation that guarantees the right of every Israeli national or resident
to engage in any occupation, profession or trade (section 3). The second one was
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
161. The IBA requested reconsideration of this case, and this request was rejected
by the court. Dangatz 7635/96, The Israel Bar Ass'n v. Ghanem Takdin 97(2), 1
(requesting reconsideration). The Court did state, however, in the rejection of this
request that the former decision was based not only on the freedom of vocation of the
lawyer but also on the right of every individual to have "free access to court." Thus
access to court was mentioned as a protected interest, but with no direct implication
of the collective responsibility of the profession to take part in fulfilling this objective.
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on the one hand, and the presumptions regarding the "private" nature
of legal representation on the other.
V. CHALLENGES TO THE DOMINATING PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY

Until the late 1990s, the Israeli bar was not outspoken or active on
issues of public concern that did not directly correlate with the legal
system, lawyers' interests or their work sphere. In an era pervaded by
severe human rights violations and infringements on the rule of law,
the bar maintained its "apolitical and independent" stance.' 62 By
contrast, in cases relating to the legal system or to legal
representation, the organized bar regularly formed and expressed a
substantive position, which almost always matched lawyers' interests
to discard any real or perceived threat to the market for their services.
For example, when a public defense system was established in Israel
in 1995, the bar's position was, at the least, ambiguous. On the one
hand, it expressed concern over a grim reality in which the majority of
suspects arrested and indicted undergo criminal proceedings without
legal representation. On the other hand, the bar was anxious about
the entry of state funded attorneys into a field that had been almost
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the private bar.' 63
Similarly, despite the bar's general abstinence from taking a public
stand against human rights violations of Palestinians in the Israeli
Occupied Territories, when access to the courts was at stake, the bar
made an exception to its common attitude. In 1997, the government
introduced a bill designed to bar Palestinians from suing the Israeli
government in court for injuries caused by the military while
suppressing the civilian uprising against the Israeli occupation." 4 The
bar objected to the proposed bill and argued that it constituted an
162. The bar's refusal to speak out against human rights violations was condemned
in the media as an inappropriate message that human rights protection lies in the
interests of politicians only. See Moshe Negbi, How Does Such a Caspi Sprout,
Hadashot, July 12, 1991 ("[T]he bar prides itself that it does not protest against
infringements in the equal protection of the law, or human rights violations, justifying
this stand by its so-called obligation to avoid political disputes. By this stand the [bar]
reinforces the claim that the protection of the rule of law and of basic democratic
values are the business of politicians only.").
163. Interview with The Public Defender, Professor Kenneth Mann, in August,
1998. Following budgetary problems facing the Public Defender, the IBA president
was approached in an attempt to enlist the bar to assist in obtaining necessary funding
for the continuance of its operations during 1996. In reply to his appeal to the bar,
stressing the bar's professional responsibility to ensure that indigent persons receive
legal representation, Professor Mann received a reply of the bar's president that this
institution has no responsibility for such representation. Letter from Hoter-Ishai,
Chair of the Bar Association, to Professor Kenneth Mann, The Public Defender,
dated Aug. 21, 1996 (on file with author); A.B.A. Commission on Professionalism, "In
the Spirit of Public Service": A Blueprint for Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism
(1986).
164. Draft Bill Handling Claims of Military Forces in Judea Samaria & Gaza Strip,
1997 (H.H. 2645 ).
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unjustified restriction on the right of access to court. The bar justified
its position by the need to maintain access to the courts, though
clearly any limitation on the right to sue would have affected the
interests of lawyers.
Likewise, when the Ministry of Justice proposed a bill to transfer
handling of some personal injury cases (of less than 10% of bodily
impairment) from the courts to the National Insurance Institute, the
bar vehemently objected to this bill, launched a massive campaign to
prevent its enactment and managed to halt the reform.'65 The explicit
concern underlying the bar's objection to the bill was the restrictions
imposed on the public's access to court. However, given that, in
personal injury lawsuits, lawyers' fees are determined as a percentage
of the damages awarded to the clients, other motives were in all
likelihood at work.
Even when the bar initiated legal action as a "public interest
petitioner," this move was confined to a cause that remained near at
hand to the legal system, to law enforcement and to lawyers'
conventional work. In December 1997, the Central Committee of the
Israeli bar filed a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court demanding the
closing of the police detention facility in Jerusalem, arguing that the
detention conditions in this old Mandatory police station were
inhumane. A similar petition was filed in December 1999 regarding
the detention center near Haifa. 6' The petitions were dismissed
following improvements of the detention facilities.
These claims do raise the question of whether bar associations
ought to implicate themselves in issues that may well be of political
controversy among their membership. There is no unequivocal
answer to this question, and professional organizations have varied in
their responses to this issue. In this context it is helpful to distinguish,
even roughly, between two types of public interest concerns. 6 7 The
165. Salzberger, supra note 74, at 68 n.115.
166. H.C. 7082/97, The Israeli Bar Central Committee v. The Minister of Interior
(order nisi issued on December 4, 1997); H.C. 3910/99, The Israel Bar Central
Committee v. The Minister of Internal Security. In a decision rendered in September
2000, the court complimented the bar for its activities on this issue.
167. In the United States, for example, the bar takes a clear stand on the issue of
legal services, but has not been allowed to lobby on issues that are of controversy
between its members. See, e.g., ABA, Consortium on Legal Services and the Public,
Legal Needs and Civil Justice: Comprehensive Legal Needs Study (1994). The
A.B.A. Ethical Canons ("EC") state that: "[t]he rendition of free legal services to
those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer."
Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility, EC 25 (1980). The newer A.B.A. Model Rules
states that a lawyer "should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono legal
public services per year." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct 8.6.1 (1993).
In Brazil, for another example, the bar has been active on almost every front
of social and political issues, including defending minority rights to keep their land,
leading a campaign to decommission arms as a strategy to reduce violence in the
country, and participating in actions of the landless peasants against agrarian reform.
See Eliane Botelho Junqueira, The Brazilian Bar Association as a Collective Cause
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first involves inadequate access to justice and unequal distribution of
legal services, to which one would expect lawyers to commit. A public
body that incorporates all members of the legal profession cannot
absolve itself from a collective responsibility to ensure equitable
access to the legal system because, de facto, legal rights can hardly be
realized without the assistance of lawyers. The secondary public
causes are those that are not directly connected to the provision of
legal services, among them human and civil rights abuses. These are
often issues of deep controversy amongst the bar's members, and it is
arguable that the professional bar must devote itself only to causes for
which there is relatively broad consensus. Bar associations differ in
their policies in this respect.16 But even considering the differences
between these two "types" of public interest concerns, it is evident
that until the late 1990s the Israeli bar had consistently absolved itself
of any actual responsibility to systematically address either of these
causes.
For many years the Israeli bar did not face significant challenges to
its dominant professional ideology or its methods of operation. As
discussed above, the Supreme Court endorsed the bar's understanding
of its profession's role. Other legal institutions such as the Ministry of
Justice or the Attorney General did not constitute oppose this view
either. 69 Individual lawyers did not speak out against the dominance
of the bar's tenets in a notable manner. From the public at large there
was a limited expectation from professions in general, and the legal
profession in particular, to resume a higher degree of public
accountability."7"
Against this background a change had been taking place from the
mid 1990s. The organized bar has increasingly been confronted with
dissenting voices from within its ranks. The professional dogmata
forwarded by the bar have steadily been losing ground among lawyers
in Israel. Claims of politicization, corruption, internal power struggles
and selective enforcement of ethical standards have driven many
Israeli lawyers away from the body that was founded to represent
their interests. Changes in legal education and the opening of private
law colleges caused a sharp rise in the number of lawyers entering the
profession. This has led to stark internal competition between
lawyers, accompanied by a demand to abandon anachronistic
Lawyer, paper presented at the Law & Society Meeting in Aspen, Colorado, June
1998.
168. Halliday and Karpik explain that lawyers' commitments to liberal ideals are
often restricted to procedural justice, and fail with regards to substantive rights: "the
more lawyers' politics approach the issues that orient differences in party politics, the
more difficult it is to mobilize and the less unquestionably legitimate are their
positions." Halliday & Karpik, supra note 131, at 51.
169. See Salzberger,supra note 74, at 1, § 2.
170. On the weakness of professionals in the early years of Israeli statehood see
Keren, supra note 46, at 113-15.
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restrictions on lawyers' practices. The bar confronted challenges to its
exclusivity from newly established commercial enterprises that offered
para-legal and semi-legal services to the public.
In the mid 1990s, a group of lawyers formed a list that challenged
the hierarchy of the "old generation" of the bar. The list, Lishka
Acheret-"A Different Bar"-participated in the elections to the
central committee of the bar. Since its inception, the list has voiced
the idea that the legal profession carries a collective responsibility to
promote substantive justice. It challenged the bar to denounce
administrative detention used by the Israeli security forces and to
speak out against the miscarriage of justice in the military courts in
the Israeli occupied territories. The group demanded abolition of
Ethical Rule 27, which restricted clients' ability to switch lawyers, as
well as the ethical rule that set minimal attorneys' fees. Lawyers
within the list presented an alternative view of the organized bar's
role, one that reached beyond-although not substituting the task
of-serving the interests of its members. 171 The existing leadership of
the bar labeled this initiative as an attempt to politicize the profession.
In 1993, for example, the central committee of the bar refused to
the list that criticized
publish in its newsletter an article by the head of
172
court.
in
challenged
was
that
decision
a
bar,
the
At the same time, individual lawyers have started approaching the
Israeli Supreme Court to challenge breaches of substantive norms of
the rule of law by the state. Contrary to the traditional litigation
strategy of the bar, these matters did not necessarily bear close
relationship to the legal system or to legal institutions. In H.C.
1607/94, three lawyers and Lishka Acheret challenged the
appointment of the Consul General in Germany by the minister of
Foreign Affairs by arguing that the appointee was a personal friend of
the Minister. 73 In 1993, a group of eleven lawyers joined a petition
against the Attorney General, requesting that he dismiss the Chief of
the Israeli police following media exposure of his improper receipt of
171. Interview with Dr. Shlomo Cohen, Head of the Lishka Acheret List
(Currently, Chair, Israel Bar Association), in August 1998.
172. The bar's decision was challenged in the Israeli Supreme Court. This petition
was rejected, and writing for the majority, Justice Bach confirmed the bar's decision
to limit publications in this paper to "informative" materials only (i.e., doctrinal or
legal material), and to restrict publications that may transform the paper into a
political platform. Dissenting, Chief Justice Shamgar stated that he would accept the
petition, holding that the bar is constrained by administrative and semi-constitutional
norms of free speech, its newsletter having the status of a "public forum." Both
decisions clearly presume, however, that the bar's main duty is to handle the affairs of
its own members. Both the majority and dissent merited their decisions by resorting
to an in depth analysis of free speech doctrine. Again, the judiciary has been reactive
in considering the private-public dimensions of professionalism; H.C. 6218/93, Dr.
Shlomo Cohen v. The Israel Bar Ass'n, 49(2) P.D. 529.
173. The petition was rejected, and so was a request to reconsider the case. See
Dangatz 2751/94, Lishka Acheret v. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, 48(5) P.D. 543.
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discounted rates in hotels and other benefits.'7 4 In these cases the
lawyers-petitioners presented themselves as members of the

profession,
i.e., public figures that have a stake in guarding the rule of
175
law.

Lawyers also began opposing the restrictive measures of the bar

through legal and non-legal measures.1 76 On the adjudicative front, a
lawyer challenged the bar's decision not to allow him to announce on
his letterhead that he is a qualified accountant in addition to being a
lawyer, and, in 1997, a lawyer directly challenged the constitutionality
of this restrictive rule. 177 Such challenges have resulted in reforms of

the ethical rules in two areas: advertising and prohibited vocations. In
2001, the total ban on advertising was replaced with a regulatory
scheme, which allows lawyers to advertise their services under certain
conditions. 178 In July 2002, the prohibition on vocational activities was
abolished and replaced with a rule that defines the restrictions in
terms of conflict of interest.1 79 The bar was not able to oppose these
demands, nor to refute the pressure of competition from within its
ranks.
The previous rather unified front between the judiciary and the bar
has also been undergoing changes, as the Supreme Court's
endorsement of the bar has gradually been eroding. 80 In particular, in
1996 the relationship between the bar and the Israeli Supreme Court
became tense following an overt clash between then chairman of the
174. H.C. 7105/93. This petition was heard together with a series of other petitions
against the Attorney General dealing with the same event. See H.C. 7074/93, 7165/93,
57/93.
The court remanded the case to the Attorney General for further
investigation; in the meantime, however, the Chief of the Police had resigned.
175. The question of standing did not rise in these cases as Israel's Supreme Court
has largely relaxed the requirements of standing on issues of public concern.
176. Shmuel Mintzer, Rules of a Fossilized Guild, Haaret'z, Mar. 16, 1993. In this
article Mintzer criticized the rules that restrict lawyers from engaging in certain
vocations. He disputed the notion that lawyering was an "honorable profession"
rather than a business.
177. H.C. 4000/93, Alroi Kanbal v. The Israeli Bar Ass'n, 52 Dinim Elion 504. The
court reached quite an innovative result in this case, holding that a lawyer may state
on his letterhead that he holds the degree and title of an accountant but must take
steps to ensure that it is understood that he is not practicing as an accountant. In H.C.
6657/97, Gil Perminger v. The Israeli Bar and The Minister of Justice, the challenge to
the rule prohibiting lawyers from practicing as land evaluators was dismissed
following a settlement that applied to the petitioner only. Since 1992, when the Basic
Law: Freedom of Vocation came in force, this semi-constitutional source has served
as a major venue to bring under judicial review professional and ethical norms that
restrict lawyers' practices. On the evolution of judicial review of statutes based on the
1992 enactment of the two Basic Laws, see Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to
a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 309 (1995).
178. Israel Bar Association Rules (Advertising) 2001.
179. Israel Bar Association Rules (Additional Practices) 2002, promulgated under
the amendment to section 60 of the IBA Act. The rules are still subject to the
approval of the Minister of Justice.
180. Salzberger, supra note 74.
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Israeli bar, attorney Dror Hoter-Ishai, and the Chief Justice of the
Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak. Hoter-Ishai spoke out against
the over-activism of the Supreme Court that, in his words, was
"managing the state" instead of confining itself to the judiciary's
genuine role of dispute resolution.1 8' In a brusque interview in the
ultra-orthodox newspaper "Yated Neeman" in 1996, the head of the
bar attacked the Supreme Court and the judges directly. He accused
the judges of attending to their own careers by publishing books and
teaching in private law schools instead of serving litigants who await
court decisions for years, and claimed that justice cannot be found
within the judiciary.' 2 The harsh attack led to a temporary cease of
professional cooperation between the court system and the bar for
several months.'8 3 From within the bar, the criticism voiced by the
chair was met with objection and extensive dissent by the bar's district
chairs as well as by individual lawyers." 4 These attorneys expressed
their support for the court and denounced both the content and style
of the critique.'85
In the 1999 elections the oppositional list Lishka Acheret won the
elections and its chair was elected to head the Israeli Bar. Since that
time, the bar's maneuvers to assert its proclaimed public duties and
maintain lawyers' self interests have been more complex and
challenging.
Though more civilized and polite in its manner, the bar continues to
affirm its role as an independent legal institution guarding the
integrity of the legal system. In an unprecedented move, and against
181. Rosen-Zvi offers a somewhat different explanation for the weakened
solidarity between the bar and the judiciary. See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 130. He
claims that that the judiciary is undergoing its own sub-professionalization process
that distinguishes it from that of the bar, and the bar is reacting to this process. Under
this theory, the judges have been creating mechanisms that disassociate them from the
lawyers in various areas of professional life. Another way to understand this trend is
that the organized bar is itself becoming more distant and alienated from its members
and does not manifest the divergent conceptions about professionalism. Either way it
is evident that the bar is no longer the exclusive representative of professional
ideology amongst Israeli lawyers, both on the collective and the individual level. This
is the central argument of Rosen-Zvi. Id. at 825-26.
182. Shahar Ilan and Ben Tsion Tzitrin, The Chairman of the Bar Association:
"What is Happening in the High Court of Justice is Outrageous; No Justice and No
Law Can Be Found There;" Haaret'z, Nov. 27, 1996.
183. Judges were instructed not to take part in fora organized by the bar.
Relationships resumed after the chairs of the district committees denounced these
attacks. See Ben-Zion Tzitrin, Rift in the Bar Association: The Heads of the Districts
Denounce Hoter Ishai'sAttacks on Barak, Haaret'z, Mar. 5, 1997.
184. The media, too, condemned Hoter Ishai for his comment against the courts
and raised doubts about the status of the bar and its competence to serve as a
representative body of the profession. See Editorial, An Unbridled Assault, Haaret'z,
Nov. 28, 1996.
185. Id. (describing the public statement in which the four chairs of the bar's
district committees disapproved Hoter-lshai's statements against the judiciary and the
judges); see also We Are Proudof Our Legal System, Haaret'z, Dec. 3, 1996.
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the vehement objection of Chief Justice Aharon Barak, the bar
conducted a comprehensive survey of judges' performance among
lawyers. The bar insisted on its autonomous position within the
justice system-separating itself from the courts-and managed to
resist the strong pressure from the judiciary to refrain from
conducting this survey.'86
The bar has also been deeply engaged in efforts to curb
encroachment on its exclusive jurisdiction from private commercial
companies that started offering semi-legal services to the public in the
late 1990s, mainly in the area of personal injury and monetary
benefits. In 1998, the bar amended its ethical rules, barring lawyers
from accepting referrals from commercial entities that advertise their
legal services, and prohibiting them from offering legal services to
outside clients while employed by such entities. 87 In 2002, the bar
launched a lawsuit against one of these companies, asking for a
temporary and permanent injunction against the provision of legal
services by private non-legal entities.188 Litigation was accompanied
by a media campaign cautioning the public not to obtain nonprofessional aid and encouraging them to approach "real" lawyers
only.189
As for its explicit public obligations, the most pronounced has been
the initiation of a pro bono project of the bar.1 90 In 1999, a special
taskforce was appointed by the bar's chair to prepare the platform for
the project. Implementation of the plan, however, was met with
fervent objection from the bar's Central Committee, still under the
control of the old leadership. The dissenters argued that pro bono
work might impinge upon the interests of new and young lawyers and
would constitute unfair competition.19 1 Despite objections from
within, in May 2002 the pro bono project was launched and within
three months over 700 lawyers applied to take part in it. On
September 1, 2002, the first pro bono stations were opened.192
Alongside the changes that have been taking place within the
private bar, though slow and restrained, public interest law in Israel
186. Orech Hadin (The Attorney) 31, July 2002, 32-43.
187. Ethical Rule lB, supra note 76.
188. Civ. Req. 452/02, The Israeli Bar Ass'n v. Pitsuy Nimratz, Ltd. (Jerusalem
District Court, decision rendered Apr. 10, 2002), Civ. App. Req. 4196/02, Pitsuy
Nimratz, Ltd. v. The Israeli Bar Ass'n, decision rendered July 7, 2002.
189. Orech Hadin, The Attorney 33, Oct. 2002.
190. See, e.g., Memorandum, Position Paper on the Establishment of a Pro Bono
and Legal Aid Project, from Schachar Velner, Chair of the Israel Bar Association
Legal Aid Committee, to Shlomo Cohen, the Chair of the Israel Bar Association
(Dec. 27, 1999) (on file with author).
191. Cf Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and
Law Students, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2415 (1999).
192. The project received the endorsement of Yigal Arnon, one of Israel's most
prominent attorneys, bestowing upon the initiative credibility and respect. Orech
Hadin, Hapraklit [The Advocate] 11 (July 2002).
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has been growing steadily and gaining acceptance during the 1990s.' 93
The number of public interest organizations that employ lawyers or
are assisted by legal counsel has risen significantly in the last
decade.'94 Law school clinics have been established,1 95 private lawyers
assist Non-Government Organizations through the provision of free
legal advice,196 and cause lawyering is becoming an accepted form of
practice. The legal profession in general is receiving more attention in
the academy as a subject of research. 9 7 Together, these trends signify
the beginning of a new period in the evolution of the legal profession
in Israel.
CONCLUSION

The Israeli legal profession has undergone significant changes in the
last decade. The driving forces behind these new initiatives are
numerous. Some lawyers found flaws with the bar's long-standing
193. On public interest law in Israel generally, see Stephen Ellmann, Cause
Lawyering in the Third World, in Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 142, at 349.
194. The following are the leading public interest organizations that use legal
action as a central strategy for their action, either through hired staff or pro bono
work of private attorneys: The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, The Israel
Women's Network, Adalah-The National Council for the Child, Israel Religious
Action Center ("IRAC"), Naamat (Israel's Working Women's Organization),
Hotline for Victims of Violence, The Movement for Quality Government, The Tel
Aviv Law Faculty Clinical Education Program, The Israel Human Rights Center for
Persons with Disabilities ("Bizchut"), Workers' Rights ("Kav Laoved"). For a more
general review of public interest organizations supported by the New Israel fund, a
leading organization that funds public interest organizations in Israel, see NIF 2001
Annual Report available at www.nif.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
195. The following institutions have set up programs for community involvement of
their law students: Haifa University Law School (two clinical programs and one
research program); Bar Ilan Law School (three clinical seminars in which students
provide legal assistance under the supervision of a lawyer); Hebrew University in
Jerusalem (support of a student pro bono program and an externship clinic); Tel Aviv
Law Faculty (six full time accredited clinics); Ramat Ran Law College (four
accredited courses, a Human Rights Study Unit, support of a full time attorney); The
College for Managerial Studies (Law Faculty) (a women's rights clinic and an
accredited course for community legal advice); Manchester and Netanya College
(criminal justice clinic); The Inter Disciplinary Center, Hertzeliya (one "social rights"
clinic).
196. The most prominent are The Movement against Poverty ("Halev"), that
engages over 100 lawyers as volunteers in community centers, and "Adam" law office,
a private law firm that established a pro bono department in 2001.
197. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, Cause Lawyers Crossing the Lines: Patterns of
Fragmentationand Cooperation Between State and Civil Rights Lawyers in Israel, 5
(2/3) Int'l J. of the Legal Prof. 193, 197-98 (1998); Lisa Hajjar, Cause Lawyering in
TransnationalPerspective: National Conflict and Human Rights in Israel/Palestine,31
Law & Soc'y Rev. 473 (1997); Rosen-Zvi, supra note 130; Salzberger, supra note 74;
Ron A. Shapira, Law Professors as Sub-Profession, 17(1) Bar Ilan Law Studies 263
(2001); Neta Ziv, Public Interest Lawyering: Who is the Public? What is the Interest?
Ethical Dilemmas in the Representation of Minority groups in Israel, 6(1) Mishpat
Umimshal [Law & Government in Israel] 129 (2001); See also 25(2) Iyunei Mishpat
[Tel Aviv Law Review] (2001), devoted to legal education.
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apolitical position, and its abstention from taking a stand on violations
of human rights and the rule of law. Other lawyers wanted to get free
of the bar's extensive grip over their professional conduct and to get
rid of the various archaic restrictions imposed on their practice. Still,
many lawyers were driven by a commitment to public service,
reflecting a new, alternative perception of their professional
obligations.
Whether these new trends are driven by pure self-interest or they
represent an expectation for higher professional accountability, their
cumulative significance cannot be ignored. They probiematize the
standard notions of professionalism that have dominated the
discourse on the meaning of legal professionalism in Israel for many
decades.
Robert Nelson and David Trubek underscore the importance of
these mixed voices and consider them an important part of the
"professional ideology" in a given society. Professional ideology,
according to these authors, is "the body of thought and practices
through which a profession (or its constituent groups) develops and
promulgates ideas about the nature of its work and the identities of its
practitioners."19' 8 In this sense the legal profession in Israel has been
undergoing a process of giving new meaning to its public role, the
legitimizing basis for its claim to professionalism. It no longer situates
itself completely within the sphere of state, as in the early era of
Israeli statehood, nor in the private sphere alone, as in the second
stage of its development. The legal profession in Israel is constructing
itself as part of Israel's evolving and expanding civil society, while
engaging in an ongoing debate about the ways to reconcile its private
commitments and public responsibilities.

198. Robert L. Nelson and David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigmsin
Studies of the Legal Profession, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices 15 (Robert L.
Nelson et al. eds. 1992).
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